Aviation Critical Safety Items (CSIs)

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Naval Aviation Critical Items

DoD NSNs: 4.9 Million

CSI = Catastrophic or Critical Consequences (tailored MIL-STD-882 CAT I or II)

CAI = Mission Loss or Safety Impact

DLA NSNs: 3.9 Million

905,000 NSNs (Naval Aviation)

530,000 CAIs

30,000 CSIs
Critical Safety Item
Arresting Wire Socket and Pin

Pin not heat treated to provide proper strength......

Poured socket with visible cracks......
F-14 Nose Tow Launch Bar Pin

“DURING DROP CHECK OF NOSE LANDING GEAR, MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL NOTED LAUNCH BAR EXTENDED SLOWLY DURING NLG EXTENSION. REMOVAL OF LAUNCH BAR REVEALED LAUNCH BAR PIN CRACKED IN HALF. LAUNCH BAR PIN WAS REPLACED 16JAN01 AND HAD ONLY 21 CATAPAULT LAUNCHES. IT IS VERY LIKELY THAT THIS DEFECT WOULD HAVE GONE UNDETECTED HAD UNRELATED MAINTENANCE OF THE NOSE LANDING GEAR DOOR/DROP CHECK NOT BEEN PERFORMED. POSSIBLE LOSS OF AIRCRAFT/POTENTIAL LOSS OF AIRCREW.”

(March 2001 VF-102, USS Theodore Roosevelt)

- Service Life ... 2000 Catapults (Inspect Every 100)
  - Failure Discovered ... 21st Launch
- 300M Steel Req’d
  - 1018 Steel Used
- Full Hardening Req’d
  - Case Hardened
- Markings To Be Vibra-Etched ... No Markings
- Unapproved Source ... Wrong Drawing
- 250+ Pins On-Hand ... ½ Unmarked
- Bulletin, Red Stripe, Emergency Buy
Critical Safety Item
Holdback Bar Release Element

Holdback Bar
- Restrains Aircraft Prior To Catapult Firing

Release Element
- Calibrated “Weak Link” … Designed to Break At Precise Pressure/Aircraft
  - EA-6B Breaking Strength = 53,000 LBS
- 100% Magnetic Particle Inspection Required
  - Mag Particle Inspection Symbol Stamped on Both Ends
- 32,000+ Procured
“This part is critical and needs to be made correctly. The part was not made correctly and the H-53 FST is writing a bulletin to remove these from service. … It is a concern and a bulletin is being prepared or has been prepared to inspect for nonconforming bolts by manufacturer. We are not going to play what if games or make different assumptions if the bolts will or will not fail because of the nonconformances. If a bolt fails to retain one tail rotor blade, the imbalance will rip off the tail rotor and tail rotor gearbox and the aircraft goes into uncontrolled flight. Catastrophic (category I) failure consequence: LOSS of aircrew/aircraft. We do not want to make some assumptions about failures or not failing when the consequences are catastrophic.”
Boss Coupling
(Used In T/AV-8B, F/A-18, and T-45 Escape Systems)

Interior of Mis-Manufactured Coupling, Showing Improperly-Machined Seat and Machine-Shavings

Tip of SMDC Line Showing Seating Area Which Contacts Mis-Machined Seat of Coupling Boss, Thereby Preventing Proper Installation of SMDC into Coupling Boss and Leading to Excessive Tip-to-Tip Gap Between SMDC Lines and Impaired Environmental Sealing

SMDC Connected to Mis-Manufactured Coupling, Showing Uncompressed O-Ring Seal Which Degrades Environmental Integrity of SMDC System
Problem (April 2000):
- Gaskets Used in Reaction Control System
  - 2 MAG-13 Failures
    - 1 Detected Because of Fire Warning Light and Other During Recurring Inspection
  - No Evidence That Manufacturer Was Approved/Qualified
    - Wrong Material in 1 out of 3 Contracts
    - Bulletin Issued -
      - Visual Inspection .. Replace Within 1 Year
      - Purge Inventory

“The one part of this issue that really crumbles my cookies is that this appears to be the same vendor who made other bad gaskets a couple years ago. We had to purge the system then too. It appears that DLA has gone right back to the same vendor. We just don't have the resources to address the same problem twice (nor the intestinal fortitude). … now, the AV8B program has to wrestle with how to purge the system and more importantly, our aircraft, of this "bad" batch of gaskets. We'll continue to work that issue with our program guys and I think there are ways to mitigate our impact. We don't have a huge safety problem here but it has to be fixed soon. It makes a lot of extra work for our engineers and, especially, the squadron maintenance guys who are already overworked."
C-130 Rigid Flap Actuator Connecting Link
P/N 340188-4, NSN 3040-00-096-4861

Banking and Community Perspectives
Issue 1, 2001
Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas
http://www.dallasfed.org/ca/bcp/2001/bcp0101.html

E-Commerce Resource Centers

Theresa Chavez knows the benefits of e-commerce and the San Antonio Electronic Commerce Resource Center. In 1991, Chavez, her husband and brother-in-law started High Quality Machine Shop in southwest San Antonio with two Air Force contracts for airplane hardware. But the business struggled with only eight full-time employees, and Chavez soon realized the company needed greater operating efficiency—and more business.

Five years ago, she heard about the San Antonio center's services. With the help of several classes and one-on-one technical assistance, Chavez's company now relies on the Internet for securing government contracts. Today, the machine shop has contracts with seven Air Force bases. Chavez employs 16 people part-time and has doubled her revenues, from $600,000 in 1991 to more than $1.2 million last year. None of this would have been possible, she believes, without the Electronic Commerce Resource Center.

Office of Inspector General

Item: Aircraft Parts Manufacturer Guilty of Inspection Fraud
Date: November 6, 2001
Type: Investigation
Summary: High Quality Machine Shop, an aircraft parts manufacturer in San Antonio, TX, pleaded guilty in U.S. District Court in Raleigh, NC, for falsely representing to the U.S. Coast Guard Aircraft Repair and Supply Center in Elizabeth City, NC, that it had inspected a bellcrank spacer sleeve—a critical part for USCG Banking and Community Perspectives

Defective Weld
<20% Circumference Joined by Weld

Low Hardness, Not Re-Heat Treated After Welding

“MAINTENANCE PERFORMED ON ACFT BUNO 150687 REQUIRED WING FLAP SYSTEM TO BE CYCLED. AUX PUMP WAS CYCLED FOR REGULAR OPS CHECK WITH NO LOAD. UPON COMPLETION, GROUND PERSONNEL DISCOVERED SHEARED FLAP LINK ON RH OUTBOARD FLAP, OUTBOARD LINK POSITION. FURTHER INSPECTION OF FLAP LINK REVEALED FAILURE OF WELD APPROXIMATELY 2 INCHES FROM ROD END (REF B, PG. 2-212, FIG. 21, ITEM 5). FAILURE CAUSED THE OUTBOARD FLAP SECTION TO DISCONNECT FROM THE ACTUATOR. THIS SUSPECT DEFECT OF WELD DOES NOT SEEM TO BE EXCLUSIVE TO ONLY ONE FLAP LINK. SIXTEEN (16) NEW UNINSTALLED LINKS WITH SAME MFG CODE AND MFG DATE WERE FOUND DEFECTIVE BY NAVYNAVDEPOT CHERRY PT ENGINEERING.

SIXTEEN (16) OF THE TWENTY (20) UNINSTALLED FLAP LINKS WERE HAND DELIVERED TO KC-130-FST AS REPORTED IN REF C. LAB ANALYSIS CONFIRMED THAT SUSPECT WELDS OF ALL 16 LINK ASSEMBLIES WERE FAULTY. REQUEST ACTION BE TAKEN TO PREVENT FURTHER ISSUE OR USAGE OF REMAINING ASSETS WITH CAGE CODE 0B011

POSSIBLE LOSS OF ACFT/PERSOENNEL”
SUU-63/BRU-32 Pylon Bolt

Bolts Attach Bomb Rack to Pylon
- Pylons Provided w/Bolts By Contractor
- “Forged” Bolt Heads Required
  - 70 Pylons w/Machined Bolt Heads Delivered (293 Bolts Total)
- Non-Approved Source
  - No Supplier Eval Prior To Award
  - QA Not IAW W/Requirements
- “New” Owners Reported Problem
- Useful Life < 3 Years vice 10 Years
Army H-60 Planetary Carrier
“Hasn’t Failed Yet” … “Will Never Fail”

“Hasn’t Failed Yet”…
- Catastrophic Consequences Well Understood, but because
  - Low Failure Probability
  - Tens of Thousands Hours of Failure Free Use
  - FSP/CSI Not Coded

“Will Never Fail” …
- CAT 1 QDR … Low Main Transmission Oil Pressure
  - CCAD Teardown Revealed Cracked Planetary Carrier
  - Abnormal Gear Loads Damaged Internal Shim
  - Shim Pieces Into Sump & Clogged Filter
- 2nd Failure Detected by Subsequent Inspection/Teardown
- 2+ Year Engineering Investigation
  - Poor Traceability/Tracking

“Although in this instance the failure was detected prior to loss of main rotor drive, future planetary carrier failures may not provide an impending failure indication. If undetected, this failure mode could result in loss of drive to the main rotor shaft, which could result in loss of aircraft and/or injury/death of crew. (Hazard Severity – Catastrophic).”

(Army Risk Determination memorandum)
T64 Compressor Assembly Shouldered Studs (P/N 4026T91 ... NSN 5307-00-151-9238)

- Waspaloy Req’d
- Hastalloy Provided
- Critical Item – Source Inspection Req’d
- Critical Application Item
- Correct Spec & Drawings cited

[Image of T64 Compressor Assembly Shouldered Studs]
“VAQ-139 WAS UNABLE TO REMOVE WORN PIN ATTACHED TO FLAPERON AND AS SENT TO WORK CENTER 51A FOR REPAIR. UPON REMOVAL OF PIN THE TECHNICIAN NOTICED PIN WAS TOO SOFT OF A MATERIAL. AFTER TESTING THE PIN FOR HARDNESS TESTING THE RESULTS SHOWED AN ROCKWELL OF 10 INSTEAD OF ROCKWELL 39-45 OF 410 STAINLESS STEEL. THIS IS IAW GRUMMAN PRINT FROM NATEC (GAC515 REV 21076 200M REV 076)”

Engineering Investigation: RCN N44329-04-0445, 23 Dec 04

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### HMRs Submitted Report Details

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**Specified Report Criteria:** Date Range = '1-JAN-2005' to '31-DEC-2005'; Report Type = 'EI,HMR,HMR/EI'; Classification = 'S'

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Office of Inspector General

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

Wednesday, July 7, 1999

Contact: Jeff Nelligan

OIG 1199

PHM, VICE PRESIDENT PLEADS GUILTY IN SUBSTANDARD AIRCRAFT PARTS CASE

A Florida manufacturer and distributor of aircraft parts and its vice president have pleaded guilty to making false representations about the regulatory conformity of products made by the firm, the U.S. Department of Transportation's Office of Inspector General announced today.

Air Pro Inc. and John Wilson, the vice president pleaded guilty on June 30, 1999 in U.S. District Court in Miami. Though sentencing is set for September, the firm has agreed to pay a fine of $365,000. Offered to replace substandard parts and improve their quality control, Wilson, the firm's operations manager, faces up to five years in prison.

Aided by the OIG, the two firms are known to both military and commercial customers for the parts made from materials that are not subject to safety standards. Some parts carry aircraft fuel, oil or hydraulic fluid and are parts critical to flight safety.

The investigation also found that Air Pro had substituted polyethylene for Teflon in its motor protection sleeves for certain boxes. Teflon is more abrasion resistant and can withstand temperatures of up to 400 degrees, while polyethylene may fail at 250 degrees or less.

In a related investigation, Air Pro and one of its suppliers, a manufacturer of spark plugs for aircraft, have been ordered to pay a $250,000 penalty and are required to implement a quality control program that will include pre-shipping inspections of all parts.

PARTS FRAUD

The OIG is investigating the sale of non-compliant parts to regulatory agencies.

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The investigation also disclosed that Khan had previously been convicted during the early 1990s and served time in Federal prison for prior crimes involving Defense contracting fraud and tax evasion. As a result of that earlier conviction, the U.S. Air Force, in March 1995, officially debarred Khan from contracting with the U.S. Government until July 21, 2010.

If convicted of conspiracy, Khan and Gammoh each face fines of up to $250,000 and 5 years in prison. If convicted of violating the Aircraft Safety Act of 2000, Khan and Gammoh each face fines of up to $500,000 and prison terms up to 15 years for each count.

The investigation is being conducted jointly by the Defense Criminal Investigative Service (the criminal investigative arm of the OIG, DoD), the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the U.S. Department of Transportation. Assistant U.S. Attorney Douglas F. McCormick, Central District of California, Santa Ana, CA, is handling the prosecution.

The point of contact regarding this press release is Chris D. Hendrickson, Group Manager (GM), Western Field Office, Mission Viejo, CA. GM Hendrickson can be contacted at (949) 643-4441, extension 223.

To report suspected fraud, waste and abuse within DoD programs, contact the Defense Hotline toll-free at (800) 424-9098, e-mail at hotline@dodig.osd.mil or visit them on the World Wide Web at http://www.dodig.osd.mil/hotline.

-End-

AWARDS

15 -- SKIN, RIB ASSEMBLY, AIRCRAFT

Notice Date: July 6, 2001
Contracting Office: Supply Directorate, Contracting Department, PSC Box 8018, MCAS, Cherry Point, NC 28533-0018
ZIP Code: 28533-0018
Point of Contact: Cherie Daniels, Contract Specialist, 252-466-7504, Kathy M. Rogers, Contracting Officer, 252-466-3446
Award Number: M00146-01-M-9015
Award Date: July 5, 2001
Award Amount: $64,973.00
Line Number(s): N/A

The DOTIG and FBI investigation determined that, in or about August 2001, UAE delivered sixty “steel” grip assemblies (Bell-Texton part number 205-011-711-101) to a company called Turboanalisis, Inc., located in Phoenix, AZ.

The DOTIG and FBI investigation determined that, in or about August 2001, UAE delivered sixty “steel” grip assemblies (Bell-Texton part number 205-011-711-101) to a company called Turboanalisis, Inc., located in Phoenix, AZ. The Assemblies were supposed to be used to aid in the construction of aircraft parts used in flight safety. UAE included a CoC signed by “Oscar Munoz”, UAE’s quality control manager, as well as an FAA Form 8130-3. The DOTIG and FBI subsequently determined that the “grip assemblies” UAE supplied were, in fact, sixty surplus Bell-Texton part number 204-011-728, manufactured from “aluminum”. Their investigation also determined that the FAA Form 8130-3 provided by UAE with the grip assemblies was a fabrication, and that UAE was not in the business of selling aircraft parts.

Further investigation disclosed that, to date, Oscar Munoz’ signature was not observed on every CoC that UAE issued with parts destined for customers. However, there is no evidence that Oscar Munoz actually approved any of the UAE employees who questioned whether he had ever heard of Oscar Munoz’ signature when submitting the FAA Form 8130-3 to a customer.

The FAA Form 8130-3 is required by law to be signed by the manufacturer of the aircraft part and used to indicate that the part is free of any defects. The FAA Form 8130-3 is also used to indicate that the part is free of any defects that would affect its safe flight and operation.

The investigation also disclosed that Khan had previously been convicted during the early 1990s and served time in Federal prison for prior crimes involving Defense contracting fraud and tax evasion. As a result of that earlier conviction, the U.S. Air Force, in March 1995, officially debarred Khan from contracting with the U.S. Government until July 21, 2010.

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-End-

AWARDS

15 -- SKIN, RIB ASSEMBLY, AIRCRAFT

Notice Date: July 6, 2001
Contracting Office: Supply Directorate, Contracting Department, PSC Box 8018, MCAS, Cherry Point, NC 28533-0018
ZIP Code: 28533-0018
Point of Contact: Cherie Daniels, Contract Specialist, 252-466-7504, Kathy M. Rogers, Contracting Officer, 252-466-3446
Award Number: M00146-01-M-9015
Award Date: July 5, 2001
Award Amount: $64,973.00
Line Number(s): N/A

The DOTIG and FBI investigation determined that, in or about August 2001, UAE delivered sixty “steel” grip assemblies (Bell-Texton part number 205-011-711-101) to a company called Turboanalisis, Inc., located in Phoenix, AZ.

The Assemblies were supposed to be used to aid in the construction of aircraft parts, and were considered to be critical to flight safety. UAE included a CoC signed by “Oscar Munoz”, UAE’s quality control manager, as well as an FAA Form 8130-3. The DOTIG and FBI subsequently determined that the “grip assemblies” UAE supplied were, in fact, sixty surplus Bell-Texton part number 204-011-728, manufactured from “aluminum”. Their investigation also determined that the FAA Form 8130-3 provided by UAE with the grip assemblies was a fabrication, and that UAE was not in the business of selling aircraft parts.

Further investigation disclosed that, to date, Oscar Munoz’ signature was not observed on every CoC that UAE issued with parts destined for customers. However, there is no evidence that Oscar Munoz actually approved any of the UAE employees who questioned whether he had ever heard of Oscar Munoz’ signature when submitting the FAA Form 8130-3 to a customer.

The FAA Form 8130-3 is required by law to be signed by the manufacturer of the aircraft part and used to indicate that the part is free of any defects. The FAA Form 8130-3 is also used to indicate that the part is free of any defects that would affect its safe flight and operation.

The investigation also disclosed that Khan had previously been convicted during the early 1990s and served time in Federal prison for prior crimes involving Defense contracting fraud and tax evasion. As a result of that earlier conviction, the U.S. Air Force, in March 1995, officially debarred Khan from contracting with the U.S. Government until July 21, 2010.

If convicted of conspiracy, Khan and Gammoh each face fines of up to $250,000 and 5 years in prison. If convicted of violating the Aircraft Safety Act of 2000, Khan and Gammoh each face fines of up to $500,000 and prison terms up to 15 years for each count.

The investigation is being conducted jointly by the Defense Criminal Investigative Service (the criminal investigative arm of the OIG, DoD), the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the U.S. Department of Transportation. Assistant U.S. Attorney Douglas F. McCormick, Central District of California, Santa Ana, CA, is handling the prosecution.

The point of contact regarding this press release is Chris D. Hendrickson, Group Manager (GM), Western Field Office, Mission Viejo, CA. GM Hendrickson can be contacted at (949) 643-4441, extension 223.

To report suspected fraud, waste and abuse within DoD programs, contact the Defense Hotline toll-free at (800) 424-9098, e-mail at hotline@dodig.osd.mil or visit them on the World Wide Web at http://www.dodig.osd.mil/hotline.

-End-
## Aviation Critical Safety Items (Pre-2002)

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CSI Timeline
(Current)


Competition in Contracting Act of 1984

Federal Acquisition Reform Act of 1996

Aviation Safety Act of 2000

NAVAIR Instruction & JACG Guidance On CSIs

10 USC 2319 (Qualification Amended)

10 USC 2383 (Critical Parts) Enacted

10 USC 2383 (Critical Parts) Repealed

18+ NAVAIR Bulletins Issued On CSIs

Phaostron Instrument Protest (Pressure Indicators)

Imperial Tooling Protest (UH-1 Yoke)

Silco Engineering Protest (F-16 Brake Pistons)

DoD 4140.1-R

Draft Joint Instruction

SECNAVINST 5000.2C

DFARS Interim Rule & D2004-008

Defense Authorization Act of 2004 Sec 802

Defense Appropriation Act of 2004 Sec 8143

• **Background:**
  - Qualified Products List (QPL) For Critical Pressure Indicators
    - 2 Firms Listed on QPL … Phaostron Was Listed
  - DSCR Contract Award to Unlisted Firm (AIC) in November 1999
    - Determined AIC Was Qualified And Should Be Added To QPL
  - Phaostron Protested Award As Improper

• **GAO Determination (April 20, 2000):**
  
  “… applicable statute, 10 U.S.C. 2319 (1998) is designed to encourage competition … by providing prospective offerors an enhanced opportunity to have their products qualified prior to award of a contract. To that end, the statute affords contracting officers the authority to find that a product meets (or will meet) a qualification requirement by the time of contract award, regardless of whether the item is listed on the QPL (10 U.S.C S 2319(c)(3); FAR 9.202(c). Nothing in statute limits the contracting officer’s authority to approve a product for a procurement based on whether the product has been tested or approved by a particular entity.”
10 U.S.C. 2319 (pertains to qualification req’ts after Oct 19, 1984):

a) “… qualification requirement means a requirement for testing or other quality assurance demonstration that must be completed by an offeror before award of a contract”

b) “… The head of the agency shall, before establishing a qualification requirement:”
   1) Prepare written justification
   2) Make all qualification requirements available to offers … limited to least restrictive to meet purposes
   3) Estimate costs of testing & evaluation
   4) Prompt opportunity to demonstrate ability
   5) If testing provided under contract, use contractor not expected to benefit by results
   6) Advise offerors of results promptly

c) ((3) “A potential offeror may not be denied the opportunity to submit and have considered an offer … if the potential offer can demonstrate to the satisfaction of the contracting officer that the potential offeror or its product meets the standards established for qualification or can meet such standards before the date specified for award of the contract”.

(d)(2)(f) “Except in an emergency as determined by the head of the agency, whenever the head of the agency determines not to enforce a qualification requirement for a solicitation, the agency may not thereafter enforce that qualification requirement unless the agency complies with the requirements of subsection (b).”
## Aviation Critical Safety Items
### Policy, Regulation, & Statutory Initiatives

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<th>NAVAIRINST 4200.25D (June 02)</th>
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<th>DoD Regulation 4140.1-R (May 03)</th>
<th>DFARS (Interim Rule)</th>
<th>P.L 108-136 (FY04 Auth Act Sec 802 (Nov 03)</th>
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(a) QUALITY CONTROL POLICY.—The Secretary of Defense shall prescribe a quality control policy for the procurement of aviation critical safety items and the procurement of modifications, repair, and overhaul of such items.

(b) CONTENT OF POLICY.—The policy shall include the following requirements:

   (1) That the head of the design control activity for aviation critical safety items establish processes to identify and manage aviation critical safety items and modifications, repair, and overhaul of such items.

   (2) That the head of the contracting activity for an aviation critical safety item enter into a contract for such item only with a source approved by the design control activity in accordance with section 2319 of title 10, United States Code.

   (3) That the aviation critical safety items delivered, and the services performed with respect to aviation critical safety items, meet all technical and quality requirements specified by the design control activity.

(c) DEFINITIONS.—In this section, the terms “aviation critical safety item” and “design control activity” have the meanings given such terms in section 2319(g) of title 10, United States Code, as amended by subsection (d).

(d) CONFORMING AMENDMENT TO TITLE 10.—Section 2319 of title 10, United States Code, is amended—

   (1) in subsection (c)(3), by inserting after “the contracting officer” the following: “(or, in the case of a contract for the procurement of an aviation critical item, the head of the design control activity for such item)”;

   (2) by adding at the end the following new subsection:

   “(g) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:

   “(1) The term ‘aviation critical safety item’ means a part, an assembly, installation equipment, launch equipment, recovery equipment, or support equipment for an aircraft or aviation weapon system if the part, assembly, or equipment contains a characteristic any failure, malfunction, or absence of which could cause a catastrophic or critical failure resulting in the loss of or serious damage to the aircraft or weapon system, an unacceptable risk of personal injury or loss of life, an uncommanded engine shutdown that jeopardizes safety.

   “(2) The term ‘design control activity’, with respect to an aviation critical safety item, means the systems command of a military department that is specifically responsible for ensuring the airworthiness of an aviation system or equipment in which the item is to be used.”.
PART 209  CONTRACTOR QUALIFICATIONS

209.270  Aviation Critical Safety Items

209.270-3  Policy
(a) Contracts only with Design Control Activity Approved Sources
(b) Approval Authorities Specified in This Section Apply To CSIs

209-270-4  Procedures
(a) Design Control Activity Shall:
   (1) Approve Qualification Requirements
   (2) Qualify & ID Aviation CSI Suppliers and Products

(b) Contracting Officer Shall:
   (1) Ensure Design Control Activity Approves CSI Contractors
   (2) Refer Unapproved Sources to Design Control Activity

PART 246  QUALITY ASSURANCE

246.407 (S-70)  Nonconforming Supplies or Services
Design Control Activity Approves --- May Delegate “Minors”

246.504  Certificate of Conformance
Design Control Activity Concurrence Required
Application:

- All Aviation Programs (Acquisition and Repair/Overhaul)

Criticality Determination

- Service Design Control Activity Decision
  - Determining Factor Is Failure Consequence … Not Probability

Sourcing

- Approved Sources Only … 3-Year Re-Evaluation
- Source Approval Reciprocity Across Services
- Surplus Buys, Local Purchase, & Organic Mfg … When Approved

Quality

- ECPs, Waivers, & Deviations Approved by Design Control Activity
  - Minors may be delegated
- Government Source QA Required
- Reverse Engineering As Last Resort

Disposal

- Mutilate Defective, Suspect, & Undocumented CSIs
## Aviation Critical Item Management

**“User’s Guide”**

### NEW *

**Process Coverage Areas**

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* Existing Comparable Coverage Areas Not Indicated

** Will Only Address Aviation CSIs