Defense Standardization Program
Journal
October/December 2014

NATO/International Standardization

Impact of NATO Agency Reform on NATO Standardization

Air Force Management of Materiel ISAs

Planning for Sustainability

Standardizing Local Procurement in Contingency Contracting

Defense Standardization Program Journal

Contents *October/December 2014*



Departments

The *DSP Journal* is available only in electronic form.

To receive issues, please subscribe at the DSP website, **www.dsp.dla.mil**, or e-mail DSP-Editor@DLA.mil and put "Subscribe" in the subject line.

The *Defense Standardization Program Journal* (ISSN 0897-0245) is published four times a year by the Defense Standardization Program Office (DSPO). Opinions represented here are those of the authors and may not represent official policy of the U.S. Department of Defense. Letters, articles, news items, photographs, and other submissions for the *DSP Journal* are welcomed and encouraged. Send all materials to Editor, *DSP Journal*, Defense Standardization Program Office, 8725 John J. Kingman Road, STOP 5100, Fort Belvoir, VA 22060-6220. DSPO is not responsible for unsolicited materials. Materials can be submitted digitally by the following means:

e-mail to DSP-Editor@dla.mil
CD or DVD to *DSP Journal* at the above address.

DSPO reserves the right to modify or reject any submission as deemed appropriate.

Gregory E. Saunders
Director, Defense Standardization Program Office

Tim Koczanski
Editor, Defense Standardization Program Journal

Defense Standardization Program Office
8725 John J. Kingman Road, STOP 5100
Fort Belvoir, VA 22060-6220

703-767-6888
Fax 703-767-6876

dsp.dla.mil

Director's Forum

I've had the opportunity to participate in a number of efforts leading to change in the way an organization or institution does business in the U.S. government, in private-sector standards organizations, and at NATO.

In the mid-1990s, the initiative known as Military Specifications and Standards (MilSpec) Reform heralded a dramatic shift away from military standards and specifications toward adopting often-unspecified "best commercial practices." MilSpec Reform was a direct result of a significant decline in defense spending, which led to a quest for DoD to find ways to streamline acquisition activities and to lower acquisition costs. We engaged in huge policy changes regarding how we conduct our standardization business and how those standards were used in contracting. Change of this magnitude could never have been achieved without the active involvement and support of key stakeholders, such as the acquisition community, industry, and DoD personnel.

I've worked with SAE International as its aerospace standardization program moved from a primarily domestic focus to one of broad global focus and impact. And, most recently, I was intimately involved in the work necessary to implement NATO Agency Reform as it affected NATO's standardization organization. It is this most recent change that we focus on in this edition of our *Journal*.

The fundamental goals of change might be for an organization to transform its structure, to adjust the way it uses its resources (human capital, material, financial assets, etc.), or to address new demands. But, when a multinational organization attempts to change the way in which it functions and manages security and peacetime requirements, change must be addressed using an inclusive approach. Change must be strategic, because the results can have financial and security implications for the nations involved. Changes, whether minor or significant, will require buy-in from participating nations, which could delay implementation of new initiatives by weeks, months, or even years.

Gregory E. Saunders
Director
Defense Standardization Program Office

Making changes to NATO's standardization organization has been a challenge. We all wanted to ensure that we didn't inadvertently damage one of the most successful areas of NATO cooperation: interoperability built on standardization. But we were also charged with implementing decisions by the defense ministers to reduce the number of agencies, consolidate activities, simplify infrastructure, and implement a new leadership model. For allies and coalition partners to be sufficiently agile to address emerging global issues and security concerns, they must continually seek ways to enhance their ability to work together. Working together is what standardization is all about. It is evident in our processes, and it is the goal of our activities. We work together as people to make sure that our equipment can work together to provide the force multiplier that is interoperability.

Much remains to be seen as NATO organizational reform is implemented. There are still questions about how some things will work, but there are few questions about the ultimate goals.

This edition of the *Journal* opens a window into the ways in which the United States is participating in the needed changes to NATO standardization policies, procedures, infrastructure, and activities, and the challenges we are currently facing with implementing standardization in the international arena. It highlights fundamental changes at NATO headquarters, which reduced the institution's 14 agencies down to 3; initiatives to address U.S. compliance with international standardization agreements; assistance to nations in building stronger institutions to effectively govern themselves and engage with allies and partners; and efforts by the U.S. Agency for International Development to improve interagency and international coordination in the procurement arena.

Impact of NATO Agency Reform on NATO Standardization

By Adam Schmidt

Agency Reform at NATO, which was initiated by heads of state and government at the 2010 Lisbon Summit, has had a significant impact on the structure and operation of all 14 of the agencies that existed within NATO at the time. NATO Agency Reform aimed to improve governance and increase effectiveness, efficiency, and savings, while preserving capabilities and delivery of agencies' services. The NATO Standardization Agency (NSA) was a part of this initiative, but allies could not agree on the final form of the new NATO standardization organization until early in 2014. This article assesses the impact of NATO Agency Reform on standardization at NATO, defines the key equities for the United States, elucidates the options considered by nations, and highlights how the chosen "hybrid staff" model for the future of NATO standardization can accomplish the goals of Agency Reform, while maintaining the effectiveness of NATO's standardization efforts.

Background: Agency Reform

At the 2010 NATO Lisbon Summit, allies agreed to consolidate and rationalize the functions of 14 NATO agencies into 3 new agencies. The allied agreement on Agency Reform envisioned that the existing agencies would be consolidated into 3 new organizations structured around procurement, support, and communications and information (C&I). In addition to those broadly defined categories, the Agency Reform agreement identified four legacy agencies considered to be special cases, in that they did not clearly fall into one of the three principal areas of amalgamation. The NSA was one of those special cases.

Implementation guidance for the Agency Reform initiative was outlined in an implementation plan (IP), which was drafted and approved by defense ministers in June 2011. The IP established guidelines for several aspects of NATO Agency Reform, including proposed timelines, descriptions of as-is and to-be agency scenarios, and the structure within which NATO Agency Reform was to be executed. With regard to the NSA, the IP noted that as of the time of writing in 2010, the allies could not achieve consensus on the final status and structure of the to-be NSA. Therefore, when approving the IP for Agency Reform, defense ministers tasked the North Atlantic Council (NAC) to prepare a definitive solution for NATO standardization support by spring 2014. The NAC, in turn, tasked the Defense Policy and Planning Committee (Reinforced)—DPPC(R)—to lead, be responsible for, and oversee the work toward a solution.

Standardization at NATO: A Core Alliance Function

The activity overseen by the NSA—standardization—is one of the most important, if underappreciated, achievements of NATO. The founders of NATO recognized the value of standardization when they established the Military Agency for Standardization in

1951. Standardization enables multinational forces to operate together effectively using common equipment, procedures, tactics, and doctrine, thus maximizing political and operational synergy among allied militaries. For the United States, NATO standardization activities play a principal role in enhanced U.S. interoperability with our allies; those activities are vital in achieving the national security goals expressed in the U.S. National Security Strategy. In short, standardization is the key that allows the United States to unlock and harness the full potential of its allies. Therefore, any reform of the NATO institution that manages standardization is of keen interest to the United States.

Broadly speaking, standardization at NATO covers three core areas:

- *Standardization management*. This area includes the development, ratification, promulgation, and implementation of the rules, policies, and regulations associated with standardization at NATO. This area also includes standardization management support to tasking authorities (the senior committees within NATO), terminology coordination, cooperation with civilian standardization bodies, and standardization promotion. The lead committee for this area is the Committee for Standardization (CS). The CS is co-chaired by the Director General of the International Military Staff (DGIMS) and the Assistant Secretary General for Defense Investment (ASG/DI).
- *Operational standardization*. This area enables U.S. forces to operate as effectively, efficiently, and safely as possible with the forces of allied, coalition, multinational, and friendly nations. This area covers doctrinal and training standardization, including logistics standardization issues. The lead committees for this area are the Military Committee (MC) and the Logistics Committee. The work within this area is carried out by several working groups and panels under the direction of several standardization boards.
- *Materiel standardization*. This area supports harmonization of future defense materiel capability needs, laying the groundwork for reciprocal international cooperation, specifically in the areas of research, development and testing, production, and procurement. This final area of standardization at NATO includes equipment standardization. The lead senior committees are the Conference of National Armaments Directors; the Consultation, Command and Control Board; and the Air Traffic Management Committee. Similar to the work within operational standardization, the work in this area is carried out by several working groups.

To understand the course of Agency Reform at the NSA, it is important to understand the agency's legacy structure in terms of governance, administration, and funding arrangements. In 2010, the NSA served as the executive arm of the NATO Standardization Organization (NSO), which was a NATO subsidiary body operating under the authority of the NAC, through the CS, in accordance with the NSO charter. The CS,

exerting domain governance over the NSA, acted as the Senior Policy Committee (SPC) for alliance standardization and as the Board of Directors (BoD) for the NSA. As the BoD, the CS ensured that the NSO, with the NSA as its executive staff, was an efficient and effective organization providing the required services to its stakeholders. The CS also approved the allocation of the NSA's resources, proposed the NSA's personnel establishment, and selected the NSA director, who, with the endorsement of the MC, was appointed by the Secretary General. The NSA was financed under the military budget, and the director was responsible to the MC, which exerted organizational governance over the NSA for the management of NSA's budget and manpower.

U.S. Equities and Criteria for Assessment

The United States participated actively with the International Staff (IS) and allies in the extended discussions on the future of NATO standardization. Throughout the process, the United States encouraged the IS and nations to borrow from the development model used for the establishment of the support and C&I agencies, and sought the active involvement of national and NATO standardization specialists in planning the future of NATO standardization support. Internal to the United States were competing views that were coordinated and distilled into a series of key equities. Those equities, summarized below, guided the U.S. input to the standardization reform discussion and its final position on the future of NATO standardization:

- Any solution for future NATO standardization support must not affect the delivery of the core functions currently provided by the NSA, namely, support to both operational and materiel standardization working groups and activities, promulgation of policies and processes for standardization products, liaison with civilian standardization bodies, and promulgation and management of all NATO standards and associated documentation.
- Any solution must provide for a substantial, sustained, and well-defined role for the ultimate producers and consumers of standardization, the nations.
- NATO standardization support must retain both visibility and high-level connectivity to all key standardization stakeholders, including the IS, NATO partner nations, NATO policy committees, and so on. The United States posited that NATO standardization is and should remain an enterprise-level activity of the alliance.
- Domain (substantive, technical standardization issues) and organizational (budgetary, manpower, and practical matters) governance of standardization activities at NATO must remain in fair balance; in particular, domain governance should be executed by a body knowledgeable in standardization activities.
- The standardization body should maintain a practical level of autonomy with regard to its funding, personnel establishment, and authority chain.

- Any solution for future NATO standardization support should show promise in the medium to long term, if not immediately, for generating savings without affecting standardization core functions.

Options

To frame the discussion on the future of NATO standardization, the DPPC(R), with significant, substantive input from the CS, MC, and nations, developed several options:

- *NATO standardization as an independent body.* This option would maintain the status quo. Specifically, the CS would remain the BoD and would continue to be co-chaired by the DGIMS and the ASG/DI, and the NSA director would remain responsible to the MC for budget, manpower, and operational standardization issues. The transformational improvements associated with efficiencies, effectiveness, and cost savings sought through Agency Reform would be found through the NSA's internal rationalization efforts.
- *NATO standardization integrated with Allied Command Transformation (ACT).* Integration of the NSA staff with ACT would closely link standardization support with other interoperability enablers, in the spirit of maximum support to the NATO Defence Planning Process (NDPP). In this model, the CS would continue as NATO's SPC for standardization, while organizational governance would be executed by the MC through the Supreme Allied Commander of Transformation.
- *NATO standardization modeled after the new NATO Science and Technology Organization (STO).* In this construct, the NSA would be transferred into a new executive office with a structure much like that of the STO, which combined two relatively small research-based NATO agencies, creating a consolidated structure with unified governance and more direct access to senior NATO leadership. Also in this model, the CS would combine the role of the SPC with the role of a BoD for the NSA. To mirror the STO model, the NSA director would also be the CS chair.
- *NATO standardization modeled after the NATO Office of Security (NOS) and NATO Office of Resources (NOR).* In this model, the NSA would become an independent office, with the director reporting to the Secretary General and with a close relationship to the CS. The CS would continue to function as SPC, and the nations' organizational governance would be executed by the NAC through the Secretary General. In this structure, funding would likely be changed from the military budget to the civil budget, or be a combination of the two.
- *NATO standardization as a "hybrid staff" model.* This option would preserve the existing one-body model, but place NATO standardization as an office within the International Military Staff (IMS). Although no longer an agency, the CS would continue to function as the SPC for standardization and execute domain governance, but it

would give up its role as BoD. Organizational governance would be executed by the NAC and the MC through the DGIMS and ASG/DI. Funding would continue to be provided by the military budget.

Analysis: U.S. Equities and Options

As the DPPC(R), CS, MC, and national assessments of these options progressed, it became clear that the options embodied varying visions as to the purpose, structure, and operation of a future NATO standardization organization. The following is a summary assessment of each option.

The first option, maintaining NATO standardization as an independent body, challenged the principal purpose of Agency Reform: reducing the number of NATO activities operating autonomously (as agencies) and amalgamating them in a way that would create efficiencies, effectiveness, and cost savings. Further, because it relied on delivering savings from an already highly rationalized organization (the NSA), this option would not likely deliver much in terms of real efficiencies or cost savings. The DPPC(R) deemed this option a nonstarter.

The second option, integrating NATO standardization with ACT, raised two key concerns for the United States: (1) ACT, which in this model would control the organizational governance of NATO standardization, may not have the institutional knowledge and expertise required to manage the future standardization element effectively; and (2) this model could diminish the future autonomy of a new NATO standardization organization with regard to funding, personnel establishment, and reporting relationships. This option, too, had no support in the DPPC(R).

The third option, modeling the new standardization agency after the STO model, raised U.S. concerns about the lack of potential for efficiencies and cost savings. The STO reform amalgamated the Research and Technology Agency and NATO Undersea Research Centre, presenting near-term opportunities for synergy, savings, and efficiency through the consolidation of two existing agencies. The NSA would not benefit from such synergy because it stands alone, with no obvious counterpart agency with which to find mutual savings. Some nations thought that this model offered too little reform, again missing the principal purpose of reform.

The fourth option, which would have the NSA mirror the NOS and NOR models, challenged the U.S. notions that (1) standardization should remain an enterprise-level activity of the alliance and (2) NATO standardization support must retain both visibility and high-level connectivity to all key standardization stakeholders. Because this model would have organizational governance executed by the NAC through the Secretary General, there was a risk that nations may lose the ability to provide direct input to the

organizational governance of standardization. This, in turn, could affect the effectiveness of standardization as an enterprise-level (inclusive) activity of the alliance, which is highly dependent on national participation.

The fifth option, the hybrid staff model, offered the best option for the United States with regard to the future of NATO standardization, meeting all criteria for transformation:

- Continued ability of NATO standardization support to cover all military, civilian, and other types of standards
- Optimization of accepted principles of organizational and domain governance
- Ability to support NDPP and involve all key stakeholders
- Ability to pursue Agency Reform's goals of increased efficiencies and effectiveness in service output while achieving cost savings
- Respect for the Lisbon Summit decision to reduce the total number of NATO agencies.

Outcomes and Way Ahead

In February 2014, after much discussion and debate, the allies agreed on the hybrid staff model as the most practical and politically acceptable way ahead for standardization at NATO. Nations compromised on the language dealing with several contentious issues, including selection of the to-be office's director, the boundaries of organizational and domain governance, and, perhaps most notably, the authority of the DGIMS, as the Head of the NATO Body (HONB) for standardization. Satisfied with the larger governance architecture included in the hybrid staff model, the United States accepted the budgetary and manpower oversight compromises that enabled final allied agreement on this model. Following deliberations at the DPPC(R) level, and supported by recommendations from the MC and the CS, the NAC agreed to submit a proposal for the transfer of functions from the existing NSO into a single, integrated NATO Headquarters staff element—the new NATO Standardization Office—effective July 1, 2014.

The hybrid staff model will protect key U.S. equities and provide for a structure that will be effective and efficient for NATO and its member nations. It will ensure full continuity of service while addressing the reform goals of increased efficiency, effectiveness, and cost savings. In particular, the United States welcomed the direct reporting relationship between the CS and the IMS; this will represent the principal way nations are engaged, enabled, and connected to standardization at NATO. Further, this model will allow the standardization at NATO to provide for full continuity of service, because the technical and productive aspects of NATO standardization will have no significant changes. The new staff element will not have a charter or exist as an independent NATO agency. The new office logo captures the new format succinctly: "New Name, New Logo, Same Service."

The model chosen by the nations offers a relatively status quo governance environment. The MC will exercise organizational governance over the new staff element, while the CS will continue to exert domain governance and to maintain its status as the SPC for standardization policy and management. Further, the DGIMS will be the HONB and the Peacetime Establishment Authority for the new NATO Standardization Office. The director of the new office will be responsible for the efficient functioning and administration of the staff element, in accordance with guidance from the MC and the CS, and for the implementation of the decisions in those committees. In particular, the director will be both responsible for and authorized to promulgate all ratified standardization agreements and allied publications. The director will submit proposals for the budget and organization of the staff element as appropriate.

Under the new hybrid staff model, nations, the principal stakeholders in standardization, maintain a substantial, sustained, and well-defined role as the ultimate producers and consumers of standardization. At the same time, the new NATO standardization organization will retain the resources, status, and bureaucratic relationships to ensure it can continue to serve as the technical and administrative enabler of NATO standardization. Because the new structure will operate within the context of the IMS, this solution shows real promise for generating savings without affecting core standardization functions.

About the Author

Adam Schmidt is a senior consultant in International Programs at LMI. He has held director and lead analyst roles at DoD and NATO, respectively. At LMI, Mr. Schmidt analyzes NATO governance and security policy related to the NATO Agency Reform initiative. He advised the director of International Cooperation—within the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics—and other DoD officials on identifying, developing, and protecting U.S. equities throughout the NATO Agency Reform process. Mr. Schmidt also directly supports the NATO Communication and Information Agency on its ongoing rationalization efforts.

Air Force Management of Materiel ISAs

Development, Ratification, Implementation, and Compliance

By Christopher Ptachik, Edward Durell, and Robert Bamberg

Management of operational and materiel international standardization agreements (ISAs) in the Air Force involves a number of different organizations whose roles are determined by their policy-based domain or functional process ownership. This article highlights the offices of primary responsibility (OPRs), policy, and processes involved in the management of materiel ISAs essential to the United States achieving interoperability and logistic supportability in coalition operations. Two terms are key: "ratification" of an ISA is performed by a nation, whereas "subscription" to an ISA is performed by a military service. The Air Force interacts with two different international bodies regarding international military standardization: NATO, whose membership comprises 28 nations, and the Air and Space Interoperability Council (ASIC), whose membership consists of the United States, United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand.

Air Force Lead Agent OPRs

Air Force responsibilities for representing the United States as the Lead Agent to specific international military standardization (IMS) bodies are assigned in Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 2700.01.1 As illustrated in Figure 1, Air Force policy reassigns those management responsibilities to OPRs:

- The Directorate of Plans, Programs, Requirements, and Assessments (AF/A5/8) is responsible, under Air Force Policy Directive (AFPD) 60-1,2 for the Air Force IMS program and the management of operational capability requirements. The Regional Plans and Issues Division, Directorate of Operational Plans and Joint Matters (AF/A8XX), provides the Air Force International Standardization Office (ISO). The ISO is the overall IMS manager and single office of record for all Air Force Lead Agent ISAs. The ISO is the OPR for NATO's Military Committee Air Standardization Board (MCASB) and ASIC. MCASB and ASIC each include working groups that develop and maintain both operational and materiel ISAs. ISO appoints Heads of Delegation (HoDs) to, and manages U.S. participation in, the MCASB and ASIC working groups. The ISO is designated a Standardization Management Activity to process all Air Force-related IMS documents sponsored by the NATO MCASB, NATO Fuels and Lubricants Working Group (NFLWG), Petroleum Handling Equipment Working Group (PHEWG), NATO Air Force Armaments Group (NAFAG), and ASIC.
- The Directorate of Information Dominance, Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition (SAF/AQI), manages U.S. participation in NAFAG under Air Force Instruction (AFI) 16-110.3 SAF/AQI appoints the U.S. representative to the NAFAG and HoDs to the subordinate Aerospace Capability Groups. NATO standardization agreements (STANAGs) developed by NAFAG are materiel agreements and are ratified and implemented in accordance with AFI 60-106.4
- The Air Force Petroleum Agency (AFPA) manages U.S. participation in the NFLWG

and interfaces with the ISO for HoD assignment and U.S. ratification coordination of its ISAs. NFLWG develops materiel ISAs.

- The Air Force Civil Engineering Center manages U.S. participation in the PHEWG and interfaces with the ISO for HoD assignment and U.S. ratification coordination of its ISAs. PHEWG develops materiel ISAs.
- The Headquarters Air Force Director of Operations (AF/A3O) manages U.S. participation in the NATO Air Traffic Management Committee (ATMC) and interfaces with the ISO for U.S. ratification coordination of ATMC operational ISAs.

Figure 1. Management of Materiel ISAs



Development of Materiel ISAs

ISAs are developed using the procedures of the respective IMS body. CJCSI 2700.01 and AFI 60-106 give responsibility to the HoD for managing U.S. participants in development of the Lead Agent's ISAs. There is no formal, and little informal, ISO or Departmental Standardization Office (DepSO) involvement prior to release of the draft ISA for national ratification by the working group's Tasking Authority (TA). At that point, the Air Force Lead Agent ratification coordination process begins, as illustrated in Figure 2, using NATO terminology.

Ratification Coordination of ISAs

AF/A8XX manages the Air Force Lead Agent ratification coordination process. The IMS body's TA releases its ratification draft ISA to a national OPR. The U.S. Military Delegate to NATO (USMILDEL) is OPR for agreements prepared under the Military Committee. The U.S. Mission to NATO is OPR for agreements prepared under other NATO

Figure 2. Air Force Lead Agent Ratification Coordination Process



Note: NSO = NATO Standardization Organization.

committees and subordinate groups. This includes the Conference of National Armaments Directors/NAFAG and the NATO Pipeline Committee/NFLWG and PHEWG. The national OPR forwards the ratification draft to AF/A8XX for ratification coordination by all U.S. OPRs that subscribe to (have equity in) the agreement. This coordination process includes both operational and materiel ISAs.

Service OPRs review and confirm their subscription to the ISA, recommend a ratification position, specify any reservations to the terms of the agreement, and identify their plan for implementing the agreement. AF/A8XX adjudicates the recommendations, formulates a U.S. ratification position, and forwards the position to the national OPR, who, in turn, sends it to the responsible TA.

Ratification and Implementation of Materiel ISAs

If ratification coordination involves a materiel agreement, the Directorate of Engineering Management, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Science, Technology and Engineering (SAF/AQRE), coordinates on the ratification recommendations and implementation plans and may assist AF/A8XX with identifying technical, acquisition, and sustainment organizations with equity in the agreement.

Unlike operational ISAs, many of which have directed implementation effective dates associated with ratification, materiel interoperability agreements affect materiel items and programs going forward from the date of national ratification. U.S. implementation of ratified materiel agreements generally involves placing the agreement and the technical

requirements document associated with it in the DSP's ASSIST database, as shown in Figure 3. This action makes the documents readily available for identification and use by program offices for future procurements.

Figure 3. Implementing Materiel ISAs



Notes: ABCA = American, British, Canadian, and Australian; AP = allied publication; and NGS = non-government standard.

As the Air Force DepSO for DSP and the functional OPR for Air Force engineering, SAF/AQRE's review focuses on conformance with standardization policy and the Air Force and subscribing services' plans for implementing the agreement. Plans that employ unconventional documents for implementation are evaluated for their feasibility. Plans that require revision of existing DSP documents to incorporate new or revised ISA requirements are evaluated for completeness of coordination with the DSP preparing activity of the implementing document.

Figure 4 summarizes the responsibilities of the AF OPRs for managing, developing, ratifying, and implementing Air Force Lead Agent ISAs.

Compliance with Materiel ISAs

Compliance with materiel ISAs occurs in the Air Force when a program office includes the ratified agreements in a procurement or internal development action subsequent to ratification and implementation of an ISA. This can occur if a warfighter establishes a capability requirement for coalition interoperability covered by a materiel ISA or if a program manager identifies the U.S. ratified materiel ISAs applicable to his program and plans to comply with them. Figure 5 shows the general processes required for compliance to occur.

Figure 4. OPR Responsibilities for Air Force Lead Agent ISAs

OPR	NATO MCASB	ASIC	NATO NAFAG	NATO NFLWG	NATO PHEWG	NATO ATMC
AF/A8XX	M, D, R, I*	R	R	R	R	
SAF/AQI			M, D, I			
AFPA/PTP				M, D, I		
AFCEC					M, D, I	
AF/A30						M, D, I
SAF/AQRE	R**, I	R**, I	R**, I	R**, I	R**, I	

Responsibility: M = management, D = development, R = ratification, and I = implementation.
*Operational only. **Materiel only/coordination.

Figure 5. Materiel ISA Compliance Process



Notes: APB = acquisition program baseline, CDD = capability development document, CID = critical item development, ICD = initial capabilities document, ICD = interface control document, SEP = systems engineering plan, and TEMP = test and evaluation master plan.

In the first case, a warfighter or user must establish a capability requirement that includes interoperability in coalition operations. This requirement is normally stated in an initial capabilities document or a capability development document under the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) process.

In the second case, Air Force compliance may occur when the program manager responds to the following directive guidance in Air Force life-cycle management policy:5

- Address future multinational operations in acquisition of all materiel intended for use by U.S. forces.
- Address system compatibility and logistics interchangeability for allied and coalition operations (databases, fuel, transportability, ammunition, etc.) that may need to be identified and require verification to ensure a capability is interoperable in accordance with the JCIDS manual.
- Identify and assess ISAs applicable to areas such as cross-servicing (with interchangeable fuels, lubricants, gases, and munitions), armaments, air transport and airdrop, medical evacuation, combat search and rescue, crash/fire/rescue, and geospatial/intelligence (including classification standards).

In either case, a program's engineering staff should use the DSP's ASSIST database as the primary tool to identify applicable ISAs, determine their U.S. ratification status, and account for any reservations. Applicable ISAs should be implemented in the program by using the designated implementing document, and that document should become part of the acquisition program baseline. It should also be identified in the program's systems engineering plan and its test and evaluation master plan. The ISA implementer will be included in the appropriate acquisition specification as part of the contract and becomes an element of the contractor's technical requirements used to develop and test the system.

Summary

The path to materiel interoperability and logistic supportability in coalition operations requires active management of the underlying policies and processes. In addition to the responsibilities above, SAF/AQRE and AF/A8XX monitor policy changes by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Air Force to maintain the integrated processes in Figure 6 essential for materiel ISA compliance.

[1]CJCSI 2700.01, "International Military Agreements for Rationalization, Standardization, and Interoperability (RSI) between the United States, Its Allies, and Other Friendly Nations," January 2012.
[2]AFPD 60-1, "Air Force Standardization Program," September 29, 2014.
[3]AFI 16-110, "U.S. Air Force Participation in International Armaments Cooperation (IAC) Programs," May 13, 2013.
[4]AFI 60-106, "International Military Standardization (IMS) Program," September 30, 2014.
[5]AFI 63-101/20-101(IC1), "Integrated Life Cycle Management," March 21, 2014.

Figure 6. Materiel ISA Processes and Applicable DoD/CJCS Policy



Notes: DoDD = DoD directive, DoDI = DoD instruction, DoDM = DoD manual, and RSI = Rationalization, Standardization, and Interoperability.

About the Authors

Christopher Ptachik is a retired Air Force colonel and an acquisition principal for Alion Science and Technologies. He provides subject matter expertise on ISAs and the DSP for systems engineering and acquisition to the Air Force DepSO, Engineering Management Division, SAF/AQRE.

Edward Durell is the Headquarters Air Staff government lead for the Air Force DepSO where he regularly advises the Air Force Standardization Executive. He has been an Air Force civilian for 25 years and has held numerous technical and management positions at both Headquarters and Air Logistics Center functional organizations and within program offices.

Robert Bamberg is a member of the Department of the Air Force's Civil Service, as chief, USAF ISO, AF/A8XX-ISO. He oversees the coordination and implementation of ISAs and directs the budget supporting Air Force IMS. Mr. Bamberg is the U.S. committee representative for the NATO MCASB and the national program manager for ASIC.

Planning for Sustainability

Improving the Effectiveness of Ministerial Capacity Development

By Matthew Johnson

At its September 2014 summit in Wales, NATO introduced the Defense and Related Security Capacity Building Initiative. The initiative will build upon NATO's experience supporting, advising, and assisting nations with defense and related security capacity building. In doing so, this initiative will improve the interoperability and standardization of many aspiring NATO allies and partners. Ministerial capacity development will be central to this initiative's success.

Ministerial capacity development programs and activities strengthen governance at the institutional level by helping partner nations build accountable, effective, and efficient ministries. These programs are low-cost, small-footprint approaches that support U.S. government strategic objectives and are increasingly important in the current fiscal and strategic environment. However, U.S. government audits and independent analyses have shown the need to improve the planning and execution of ministerial capacity development efforts. Specifically, lack of planning and coordination has created gaps and redundancies, wasted resources, and diminished long-term sustainability. Planning can be enhanced by leveraging best practices of established ministerial capacity development programs and international development activities. One approach, as illustrated in this article, is to develop a comprehensive planning framework that guides the five stages of implementation of ministerial capacity building activities: assessment, program development, team building, execution, and monitoring and evaluation. This framework will promote host-country ownership, alignment, harmonization, results, and mutual accountability and will ensure better use of U.S. government resources.

What Ministerial Capacity Development Is

There is common agreement in the international development community and across the U.S. government that nations require strong institutions to govern effectively. Governance is the process of decision making and includes the formal and informal structures in place to arrive at and implement decisions.[1] Capacity development is the process of strengthening the abilities of individuals, organizations, and systems to perform core functions sustainably and to continually improve and develop those functions over time.[2]

Ministerial capacity development programs develop structures and processes that support core government functions, including the management of resources and personnel. The goal is to build sufficient capacity within government institutions at the national level so that they perform core functions sustainably and improve the ability to deliver critical government services.

Strategic Importance of Ministerial Capacity Development

Ministerial capacity development programs directly support U.S. government strategic objectives and are becoming increasingly important in this constrained fiscal environ-

ment. The 2010 National Security Strategy highlights the need to invest in the capacity of strong and capable partners to strengthen the administrative and oversight capability of institutions in the civilian security sector.[3] The Quadrennial Defense Review and Defense Strategic Guidance stress the importance of building the institutions of partner states to sustain tactical and operational investments and to share costs and responsibilities with partner nations.[4]

Ministerial capacity development efforts provide partner nations with the knowledge and skills required to move toward self-reliance and reduce the dependency on international aid. Partners with effective and efficient defense institutions under democratic control are fundamental to regional and international stability and can prevent and mitigate the collapse of weak governments. By increasing transparency and accountability of key government institutions, ministerial capacity development can reduce risks of corruption and promote economic growth, security, and good governance.

The development of defense institutions also preserves U.S. government tactical and operational security cooperation investments. For example, repeatable, sustainable processes to pay, recruit, promote, and retire troops complement and preserve the goals of training and equipping programs, and they increase troop retention rates and morale.

Current Ministerial Capacity Development Approaches

Despite its strategic importance, ministerial capacity development has been an underutilized component of U.S. foreign assistance and security cooperation worldwide. Funding for ministerial capacity development assistance has been a small percentage of U.S. foreign aid and of security cooperation and assistance to partner nations.[5] Furthermore, much of the U.S. government's ministerial capacity development assistance to post-conflict nations, including Iraq and Afghanistan, has been ad hoc via teams of contract or military advisors who do not have the requisite experience, expertise, or understanding of the sociocultural context of the partner nation.[6]

Defense Institution Building (DIB) programs are focused on establishing responsible defense governance by strengthening national defense institutions.[7] DIB activities focus on four core functions of defense ministries:

- *Strategy and policy.* This function includes processes to develop national defense strategies, policies, and plans that enable a ministry of defense to organize, train, equip, and sustain military capability and capacity.[8]
- *Human resource management*. This function includes processes to recruit and retain, train and educate, track, and employ personnel in national defense organizations.[9]

- *Resource management.* This function includes processes to define mid- to long-term defense objectives, formulate intermediate plans to achieve those objectives, develop and execute annual budgets that implement the plans, and collect and review data on the results of actual expenditures and the adjustment of the plans to recognize those results.[10]
- *Logistics.* This function includes processes to plan and carry out the movement and maintenance of forces. It comprises identification of requirements, buildup of stocks and capabilities, and sustainment of weapons and forces.[11]

The first established DIB program was developed in 2005 under the auspices of the Warsaw Initiative Fund. That effort targeted Partnership for Peace nations, which include the former Soviet and Yugoslav states in Eastern Europe, the Balkans, and Central Asia.

In 2010, DoD expanded its DIB efforts globally by establishing the Ministry of Defense Advisors (MoDA) and the Defense Institution Reform Initiative (DIRI), both under the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA). The objective of the MoDA program is to deploy trained civilian advisors to the security ministries of partner nations on assignments of up to 2 years. MoDA deployed over 200 advisors to the Afghan Ministries of Defense and Interior and was granted global authority in the FY12 National Defense Authorization Act.[12] DIRI seeks to build partner ministerial capacity through short-term, periodic team engagements. DIRI subject matter experts work with partner nations to assess organizational weaknesses and establish road maps for addressing them.[13]

Other DoD activities that provide DIB support are the Defense Institute of International Legal Studies, which builds partner legal capacity in over 43 countries through periodic team engagements, and the Regional Centers for Security Studies, which provide workshops on national security planning, key leader engagement, and a venue for bilateral and multilateral dialogue.[14]

Several civil government programs also focus on ministerial capacity development. The Office of Technical Assistance (OTA), within the Department of the Treasury, builds the capacity of finance ministries and central banks in reform-minded developing and transition countries.[15] The Department of Justice's International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program develops professional and transparent law enforcement institutions, including justice and interior ministries. The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) assists health and education ministries.

Planning for Sustainability

U.S. government audits and independent analyses have highlighted the need to improve planning, implementation, and coordination of ministerial capacity development efforts. Surveys of ministerial capacity development programs revealed common shortfalls, in-

cluding a lack of program goals, strategy, and performance measures.[16] Audits by the Government Accountability Office (GAO), DoD Inspector General (IG), and Special Inspectors General for Afghanistan and Iraq Reconstruction (SIGAR and SIGIR) cited the need to better assess, plan, and coordinate U.S. government ministerial capacity development efforts to improve their effectiveness. For example, a SIGAR audit of DoD, USAID, and Department of Agriculture (USDA) capacity building efforts with the Iraq Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation, and Livestock found many shortfalls. The shortfalls included the lack of an implementation plan with specific priorities, goals, targets, and milestones; poor coordination among the different U.S. government agencies and departments; and deficient metrics to determine the progress of capacity development efforts.[17]

A DoD IG assessment of U.S. government and coalition efforts to develop the logistics sustainment capability of the Afghan National Army found a lack of an integrated plan to build the Afghan logistics capability at the Ministry of Defense and a lack of capability of the Afghan Ministry of Defense staff to plan, program, budget, and execute resources. This lack of planning and coordination has created gaps and redundancies in the overall effort to build the Afghan logistics processes and structures.[18] Those findings are illustrative of the shortfalls of ministerial capacity development programs and activities across the U.S. government.

Proper planning and clear articulation of intended results are necessary precursors for any successful ministerial capacity development program. One approach to improve planning is to integrate the five principles of the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness in a comprehensive planning framework to guide ministerial capacity development efforts across all stages of implementation: assessment, program development, team building, execution, and monitoring and evaluation. The five principles, listed below, were developed in 2005 by Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development donor and recipient countries to improve the delivery, management, and impact of international aid:

- *Ownership.* Developing countries set their own development strategies, improve their institutions, and tackle corruption.
- *Alignment.* Donor countries align behind these objectives and use local systems.
- *Harmonization.* Donor countries coordinate, simplify procedures, and share information to avoid duplication.
- *Managing for results.* Developing countries and donors shift focus to development results and measurement of those results.
- *Mutual accountability.* Donors and partners are accountable for development results.[19]

An independent analysis in 2011 reviewed the implementation of the Paris Declaration principles in seven U.S. government agencies and departments that manage official development assistance: Department of State, Department of Health and Human Services, OTA,

USAID, Millennium Challenge Corporation, USDA, and Department of Labor (DOL). The analysis found that OTA's policies and practices most closely aligned with Paris Declaration principles. Other agencies, notably, the State Department, DOL, USDA, and USAID, had external and internal constraints—such as organizational mandates, government accountability and contracting procedures, agency practices, and competing organizational cultures—that presented disincentives toward compliance with the Paris Declaration principles.[20] OTA's approach to ministerial capacity development can inform and improve other ministerial capacity development efforts across the U.S. government.

DoD security cooperation and capacity building programs were not assessed, because DoD is not an official provider of development assistance. However, DoD has many of the same constraints that impede alignment with Paris Declaration principles. Nonetheless, DoD's newer DIB activities, especially the MoDA and DIRI programs, use processes and practices that align with the Paris Declaration principles and can be used by institution building efforts across DoD to improve the effectiveness and sustainability of ministerial capacity development programs and activities.

A Comprehensive Planning Framework for Ministerial Capacity Development

Effective ministerial capacity development must be guided by a comprehensive planning framework that encompasses the five implementation stages: assessment, program development, team building, execution, and monitoring and evaluation.

ASSESSMENT

In the first stage, the U.S. government implementer, in coordination with the partner nation, would assess ministerial capacity development requirements to ensure country ownership, alignment with country needs and U.S. government priorities, and mutual accountability. The assessment would also address current capacity building and development efforts by other government agencies, international donors, and development agencies to avoid duplication and ensure harmonization.

Decisions to initiate a ministerial capacity development effort in a partner nation should be based on established criteria, including the counterpart's need for capacity building assistance, evidence of the counterpart's commitment to reform, the extent to which the effort would complement other projects in a particular country or region, and the extent to which the effort complements U.S. government policy priorities and goals. The assessment should also focus on gaps in ministerial capacity, prioritized processes and functions to be developed, and specific results to be achieved. Lastly, the assessment should determine feasibility of the capacity development effort. Security constraints, limited absorptive capacity, and restricted access to ministry officials would all impede the implementation and success of ministerial capacity development assistance.

A model that can be adapted and expanded to other ministerial capacity development efforts is the DIRI assessment framework. To assess defense institution building requirements, DIRI analyzes the project's feasibility and the country's ownership and buy-in and establishes a working group of subject matter experts and partner nation defense officials. The participants in the working group identify institutional capacity gaps and explore potential focus areas.

PROGRAM DEVELOPMENT

Upon completion of the assessment and validation of the ministerial capacity development effort, the implementer, in coordination with the partner nation, would draft an implementation plan focused on broad ministerial capacity development goals, tasks, and results to be achieved. To maximize country ownership and mutual accountability, the plan should focus on improving systems that already exist in partner nations rather than on developing parallel structures based on other standards. The plan should also specify alignment with country objectives and U.S. government interests, as well as harmonization with other capacity development efforts.

A model is the Terms of Reference (TOR), drafted by OTA advisors. An OTA TOR conveys mutually agreed-upon goals and objectives and broad timelines. It also includes detailed information on logistical support that will be provided by the partner nation, such as interpreter services or office space for the capacity development experts. If the partner nation provides support to the ministerial capacity development effort, it is more likely to achieve and sustain the goals and demonstrate country ownership and alignment. The TOR is signed by OTA and partner nation officials.

TEAM BUILDING

The next stage is to select the experts who will lead the ministerial capacity development effort on behalf of the implementer. To maximize the results of the effort and ensure long-term sustainability, the implementing team needs to have a combination of social and advisory skills, functional and technical expertise, and country and regional knowledge:

- *Social and advisory skills.* To promote country ownership and alignment with partner nation interests, the ministerial capacity development experts need to have good communication, problem-solving, and listening skills, as well as the ability to develop relationships with their foreign counterparts. Successful advisors demonstrate the four guiding principles of advising in developing long-lasting, country-appropriate solutions: demonstrate respect, humility, and empathy; support local ownership; design for sustainability; and do no harm.[21] Respect, humility, and empathy allow the experts to assess the operating environment and understand local capacity, systems, and people.

When designing for sustainability, the capacity building expert creates local capacity that will remain in place upon conclusion of the effort, taking into consideration local standards and resources, including personnel, funding, and technology. Doing no harm acknowledges that any intervention carries the risk of doing more harm than good and requires careful consideration and widespread consultation with multiple stakeholders before and during the implementation of the capacity building effort.[22] To ensure harmonization with other capacity development and development efforts, experts need to work with disparate stakeholders that often have competing interests and priorities. This includes partner nation officials across multiple levels of the ministry, U.S. government officials from the country team, and interagency and international donors.

- *Functional and technical expertise.* To plan and execute a sustainable ministerial capacity development effort, implementers need to have functional and technical experience in the specific area that they will be working on, preferably at the ministerial level. This includes an in-depth understanding of the functions and processes, end states, and cross-functional linkages. For example, an expert working on a resource management challenge needs to have substantive knowledge of resource management processes, including planning, identification, and prioritization of resource requirements, and of budget planning and execution. The expert also needs to know how resource management is linked into policy and strategy development and the management of human resources to hire and train personnel with the appropriate skills to execute and sustain the resource management processes.
- *Country and regional knowledge.* To understand the context in which they will work and facilitate the development of the best available solutions, ministerial capacity development experts need to have background on the partner nation's culture, customs, history, and political background. And they need to have a thorough understanding of the institutions they will support, as well as other capacity building initiatives in the country.

Ideally, a capacity development expert would have all three characteristics, especially if only one or two experts or advisors are assigned to a specific country. However, for larger teams, it would be appropriate to have experts that possess one or more of the necessary skills, as long as all three skills are represented in the team.

Of the three skills of successful ministerial capacity development experts, technical and functional expertise is a prerequisite and mostly acquired through professional experience. For example, MoDA advisors are seasoned DoD civilians with an average of 20 years' experience in a specific functional area. DIRI experts are current DoD civilians, annuitants, and contractors drawn from DoD agencies, think tanks, and academic organizations. Many OTA advisors are retirees from the Department of Treasury or local/state financial institutions.

Social and advisory skills have an innate component. For example, people who lack the requisite empathy, communication, and relationship-building skills to gain trust with their partner nation counterparts and advance country-specific and appropriate solutions would not be successful ministerial capacity development practitioners. However, many cross-culture advisory skills—which include working with interpreters, building rapport, developing interpersonal relationships, communicating in a crisis, and negotiating—can be taught. The same is true with country and regional knowledge and language skills.

When selecting ministerial capacity building experts, it is especially important to assess social and advisory skills that are not necessarily reflected in the resumes of functional and technical specialists. For example, the MoDA program uses interview questions based on the five core competencies of successful advisors as determined by the SkilAnalyzer assessment tool:

- *Relationship building.* Maintain a broad network of internal working relationships; facilitate a climate of trust and respect between team members.
- *Integrity.* Be tactfully and helpfully honest; demonstrate respect for others, even in difficult situations.
- *Open communication*. Help others present their message effectively; encourage candid and open communication within the team.
- *Strategic alignment*. Coordinate cross-functional activities to ensure strategic alignment with organizational objectives.
- *Organizational savvy.* Effectively advance the team's interests within the organization.[23]

Prospective MoDA advisors are evaluated throughout their training; the evaluation is based on their written and oral work, instructor input, and peer evaluations. The evaluation factors include tact, poise, humility, and respect; adaptability and resilience; listening skills; teamwork and collaboration; and oral communication.[24]

Prospective OTA advisors are evaluated during a "candidate mission," when they travel to the partner nation with OTA leadership. During this visit, OTA ensures that the prospective advisor aligns with OTA's culture and values and is compatible with the foreign counterpart. The partner nation can reject the advisor, which significantly increases country ownership of the ensuing capacity development effort.[25] Candidate missions also are being used to assess global MoDA advisors.

EXECUTION

The next stage is to develop a detailed execution plan that considers the country's needs, limitations, and culture. The plan should also harmonize capacity building efforts with assistance from other donors to prevent duplication or incompatibility. To manage for re-

sults, the plan should focus on specific targets, milestones, and end-states to ensure that sufficient progress is being made toward the ministerial capacity development goals. To ensure country buy-in, execution plans should be approved by partner nation officials.

OTA advisors develop work plans within 60 days of an advisor's arrival in the country. The plan contains specific objectives, date of completion, and milestones (successive, intermittent results, or deliverables connected to the achievement of the objective).[26]

MONITORING AND EVALUATION

The final stage includes establishment of a monitoring and evaluation framework and feedback mechanisms to measure the progress and results of the effort. The objectives listed in the execution plan can be used to develop specific, outcome-focused metrics. Monitoring tools could include periodic reports, annual work plans, field visits, and annual project reports. It is also important to plan a rigorous, independent evaluation to measure and validate results.

Monitoring and evaluation should advance the Paris Declaration principles of managing for results and mutual accountability. If the ministerial capacity building team or the partner nation is not meeting mutually agreed-upon goals, the effort can be revised or terminated.

OTA evaluates its projects using a variety of methods, including written monthly reports prepared by advisors, site visits, and independent end-of-project reports conducted within 3 to 6 months upon conclusion of a project. OTA also uses formal evaluations, which measure the traction and impact of each assistance project, and surveys, which are filled out by partner nation counterparts and other stakeholders, including U.S. Embassy officials.[27] To promote mutual accountability, OTA commits to the replacement of an OTA advisor who is not meeting the needs of the partner institution with a more suitable advisor. If the partner country fails to meet its commitments, OTA works to remind the partner of those responsibilities and can eventually terminate the assistance.[28]

Conclusion

Ministerial capacity development efforts are low-cost, small-footprint approaches that complement and sustain more costly security assistance activities and promote U.S. government strategic objectives. However, despite its strategic importance, many ministerial capacity development efforts have lacked planning, implementation, and coordination activities to improve results and sustainability. Developing a comprehensive planning framework that aligns with the Paris Declaration principles and uses best practices and lessons learned from current ministerial capacity development activities will promote country ownership, alignment, harmonization, results, and mutual accountability. This, in turn, will improve the effectiveness and positive outcomes of ministerial capacity development activities and ensure better use of U.S. government resources.

[1]United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, *What Is Good Governance?*

[2]President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief, *Capacity Development and Strengthening Framework*.

[3]The White House, *National Security Strategy*, May 2010.

[4]Department of Defense, *Quadrennial Defense Review Report*, February 2010, and *Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense*, January 2012.

[5]See http://www.dsca.mil/programs.

[6]James A. Schear, William B. Caldwell IV, and Frank C. DiGiovanni, "Ministerial Advisors: Developing Capacity for an Enduring Security Force," *PRISM*, Vol. 2, No. 2.

[7]Dr. Kathleen Hicks, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Strategy, Plans and Forces (speech, DIB Conference, June 20, 2011).

[8]Adapted from the DIB Conference Policy and Strategy Working Group definition, June 2011.

[9]Adapted from the DIB Conference Human Resource Management Working Group definition, June 2011.

[10]Institute for Defense Analyses, *Best Practices in Defense Resource Management*, January 2011.

[11]Adapted from the NATO definition of logistics.

[12]Interview with MoDA program official, October 31, 2014.

[13]See http://www.dsca.mil/programs/defense-institutional-reform-initiative.

[14]See Note 12.

[15]OTA Annual Impact Report 2013.

[16]Inspector General, Department of Defense, *Performance Framework and Better Management of Resources Needed for the Ministry of Defense Advisors Program*, DODIG-2013-005, October 2012, and *Defense Institution Reform Initiative Program Elements Need to Be Defined*, DODIG-2013-019, November 2012.

[17]Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, *Preliminary Observations and Suggested Actions before Transition of Security Services to Afghan Public Protection Force*, SIGAR Alert-12-1, March 2012; Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, *Status of Ministerial Capacity Development in Iraq*, SIGIR-06-045, January 2007; and Government Accountability Office, *Stabilizing and Rebuilding Iraq: U.S. Ministry Capacity Development Efforts Need an Overall Integrated Strategy to Guide Efforts and Manage Risk*, GAO-08-117, October 2007.

[18]Inspector General, Department of Defense, *Assessment of U.S. Government and Coalition Efforts to Develop the Logistics Sustainment Capability of the Afghan National Army*, DODIG-2012-028, December 2011.

[19]Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, *The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness: Five Principles for Smart Aid*.

[20]Department of State, *Evaluation of the Implementation of the Paris Declaration: United States Government Synthesis Report*, January 2011.

[21]Nadia Gerspacher, *Preparing Advisers for Capacity-Building Missions*, United States Institute of Peace Special Report, July 2012.

[22]See Note 12.
[23]See Note 12.
[24]See Note 12.
[25]See http://www.treasury.gov/about/organizational-structure/offices/International-Affairs/Pages/assistance-index.aspx.
[26]See Note 25.
[27]See Note 15.
[28]Department of State, *Evaluation of the Implementation of the Paris Declaration: Department of the Treasury Office of Technical Assistance Case Study*, January 2011.

About the Author

Matthew Johnson, an LMI consultant, has 7 years' experience in interagency coordination and international program management. He also has extensive experience in fostering security cooperation, building partnership capacity, and managing interagency and multinational teams. Most recently, he was the deputy director for the Global Security Contingency Fund, the first jointly funded Department of State/Department of Defense global security assistance program.

Standardizing Local Procurement in Contingency Contracting

Case Studies from DoD and USAID in Afghanistan

By Garrett Menning



Given the billions of dollars that the United States and its allies spend each year to jointly address challenges posed by the rapidly changing global security environment, the need to coordinate contracting efforts to respond to international instability and crises is critical. The world is becoming more volatile and less predictable as sectarian conflicts, insurgent movements, and violent extremism threaten global security. To meet those strategic challenges, recent quadrennial reviews from DoD, the State Department, and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) emphasize the need for greater interagency and international coordination to promote the security of the United States and its allies. Within the U.S. government, the emphasis is on integrating the "three Ds"—defense, diplomacy, and development—in foreign policy by fostering cooperation among DoD, State, USAID, and other agencies. Internationally, the United States seeks ways to strengthen its working relationships with allies and local partners, as well as with international institutions such as NATO, the United Nations (UN), and the World Bank, to effectively address common challenges posed by the new world disorder. One important step toward stronger cooperation is the development and adoption of standard tools, training, and procedures to facilitate information sharing, common understanding, and joint action to respond rapidly and effectively to shared security threats wherever they may arise.

One area requiring cooperation among the United States and its partners is counterinsurgency (COIN) contracting. A central element of the COIN strategy is local procurement, with the objective of using contracting funds to promote local ownership and prosperity as a counterweight to insurgency. For example, a major focus of the COIN strategy in Afghanistan was ensuring that the local population received maximum benefits from the billions of dollars in international funds pouring into their country, while preventing those funds from falling into the hands of terrorists, insurgents, and corrupt power brokers.

This article examines lessons learned about local procurement in Afghanistan at the height of the surge of military and civilian spending to defeat the Taliban insurgency in 2010 and 2011 and analyzes their relevance for future contingency contracting efforts. The article focuses most closely on the activities of USAID, DoD, and the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), the NATO-led multinational mission formed by the UN Security Council with the mission of supporting Afghan capacity building and countering the insurgency. Those organizations were responsible for the lion's share of spending in Afghanistan, and the article uses them as primary case studies to draw larger lessons about the importance of standardizing interagency and international procedures for local procurement in contingency environments.

COIN Contracting and Its Challenges

In 2010, as the fight against the Taliban insurgency intensified, U.S. military and civilian leaders joined with international allies to promote a common COIN contracting strategy in Afghanistan. General David Petraeus, Commander of U.S. Forces in Afghanistan (USFOR-A) and ISAF, and Ambassador Karl Eikenberry of the U.S. Embassy in Kabul issued guidance applicable to military and civilian contracting personnel in country. At the core of the COIN contracting strategy was the Afghan First policy to promote local participation, ownership, capacity building, and sustainable development by working with Afghan vendors and other organizations to procure local goods and services. A key assumption of the strategy was that using coalition contracting funds to support local prosperity would, in turn, support the campaign objectives of ISAF and the Afghan government by helping to win over Afghan "hearts and minds" and roll back the insurgency. By creating jobs and livelihoods, the strategy also sought to give locals an alternative to joining the Taliban and fighting against the coalition.

That same year, local procurement also got a boost from USAID Forward, a wide-ranging set of reforms initiated by Administrator Rajiv Shah to promote more sustainable long-term development in countries across the globe where the agency worked. The initiative stressed new models of public-private partnership and encouraged more awards directly to local businesses and civil society organizations to support the growth of strong institutions and economic growth in host countries, including Afghanistan.

Measured in terms of the number of Afghan personnel in the contracting workforce and awards made to non-U.S. contractors, the local procurement strategy in Afghanistan was successful. For example, Afghan nationals made up approximately 53 percent of DoD's 87,000 contract personnel in country in the first quarter of FY11. The U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) awarded or exercised option years for a total of just over $1.7 billion for 10,295 contracts and blanket purchase agreements in FY10, of which 8,487 (82.4 percent) went to non-U.S. contractors. In the same year, USAID obligated $331 million for 240 new awards, of which 126 (52.5 percent) went to non-U.S. vendors.[1] While some of these awardees were third-country nationals, the majority were Afghan contractors. In addition to working with contractors, the international community also directed a growing proportion of resources directly to the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA), local governments, and a large, diverse group of Afghan non-governmental organizations (NGOs).

However, the high volume of funds awarded to Afghan organizations in such a short time period also came with problems. First, the local economy and society were not easily able to absorb the flood of resources that came with the surge. The small size of the Afghan economy relative to the volume of money injected into it by the international

community was a key problem. Rudimentary physical infrastructure, political weakness, poorly developed financial and legal institutions, and lack of necessary human capital also posed major obstacles. Equally detrimental was the international community's ignorance of local market conditions and the mutual lack of understanding between foreign contracting personnel and Afghan vendors. Language and cultural barriers fed mistrust and confusion, making the "meeting of the minds" necessary for proper contracting problematic, especially given the complexity of international acquisition regulations and the differences in contracting rules and procedures between different civilian and military organizations.

A second problem was tracking, monitoring, and evaluating how funds were being used by local recipients. The difficulty of first-hand observation of contractor performance in remote, rugged, and high-threat areas made official monitoring difficult, if not impossible, in some parts of the country. So much money being awarded in so short a time to so many local contractors also made it difficult to track who received the funds for goods and services provided, especially in the case of awards with multiple layers of subcontractors. Reports surfaced of subcontractors taking a cut of an award without doing any work before "flipping" it to another subcontractor. Moreover, many Afghan companies held multiple contracts with different international organizations, which had little, if any, reliable information about contractor performance on any awards except their own.

The third and final problem flowed directly from the first two and raised the gravest concerns: the likelihood that coalition funds could be diverted and misused by so-called "malign actors," including terrorists, warlords, insurgents, and criminal networks. A number of reports published around the time of the surge uncovered instances of fraud, corruption, and diversion of funds among DoD and USAID contractors who were not closely monitored because they operated in remote and highly kinetic areas. In other situations, investigators found that fees charged for project security were little more than protection money paid to local warlords or the Taliban. Host-nation trucking, construction, and private security contracts were considered particularly high risk.

Improving COIN Contracting Cooperation

By 2010, it was clear that stronger cooperation among U.S. military, U.S. civil, and international organizations could help the coalition address many of the vexing problems associated with local procurement in Afghanistan. There were obvious benefits in sharing information about contractors, cooperating in Afghan First outreach efforts, and synchronizing contracting procedures and methods in line with common COIN goals.

A number of organizations and working groups played important roles in fostering cooperation on key COIN contracting issues. The Office of the Coordinating Director for

Development and Economic Affairs (CDDEA) provided policy and program guidance, coordination, and oversight across State, USAID, and other sections and agencies at the U.S. Mission in Afghanistan, and it facilitated communications between the U.S. Embassy and USFOR-A/ISAF. CDDEA and USAID representatives participated on a number of USFOR-A and ISAF COIN contracting working groups and board meetings, and representatives from both the U.S. military and USAID attended regular Afghan First working group meetings at the U.S. Embassy. USAID's Office of Acquisition and Assistance (OAA) benefited from U.S. military embeds who helped with its COIN contracting efforts and improved civilian-military cooperation. Finally, working groups bringing together development organizations, including the World Bank and UN organizations, and bilateral donors, such as USAID, also provided forums for exchanging information about the efficacy and impacts of international assistance in Afghanistan and progress toward the Afghan First goals of local capacity building and institutional development.

CDDEA, USAID, ISAF, and DoD also participated together in contracting meetings with Afghan officials, as well as with vendors. Representatives from ISAF and USAID/OAA met with Afghan counterparts from the Office of the National Security Council (ONSC). The ONSC forum was fruitful for exchanging information about U.S. government and GIRoA contracting approaches, but yielded few other concrete results. To reach out to local contractors, USAID participated with the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and other branches of the U.S. military in a variety of vendor fairs and Afghan First events to reach out to Afghan business people and NGOs across the country, letting them know about U.S. contracting opportunities and requirements and explaining federal processes for acquisitions and assistance.

Cooperation between the international community and GIRoA permitted "on-budget" contracting, in which a growing proportion of aid was funneled through the state so that the Afghan government and security forces could shoulder greater responsibility for the development and defense of their own people. The Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF), administered by the World Bank, was an important instrument for administering and monitoring on-budget contracting. ARTF allowed the United States and other donors to program money through a common vehicle, and the World Bank assessed local capacity to absorb, oversee, and manage this assistance before it was disbursed.

A number of DoD/ISAF task forces supported COIN contracting objectives. These included the Combined Joint Interagency Task Force Shafafiyat ("Transparency") to support and integrate anticorruption efforts on the part of the Afghans, ISAF, and key partners; the Task Force for Business and Stability Operations (TFBSO) to promote economic stabilization and security; and the Task Force Spotlight to address corruption in private security contracting. USFOR-A established Task Force 2010 (TF 2010) to in-

crease the transparency and accountability of U.S. contracting flows. TF 2010 provided a key forum for exchange of information on contracting corruption between the U.S. Embassy and USFOR-A; and its team of acquisition experts, forensic auditors, intelligence analysts, and criminal investigators were able to provide actionable information to assist operational commanders, other U.S. agencies, and GIRoA in addressing contracting fraud and abuse.

The international coalition in Afghanistan also worked with civil society organizations from around the world to promote local procurement. One of these was Peace Dividend Trust (PDT) (now called Building Markets), which operates in Afghanistan and other war-torn countries to facilitate local procurement. PDT worked with Afghan entrepreneurs to register their businesses, bid on tenders, and win international contracts.

These organizations helped to promote vital synergy and reduce duplication of COIN contracting efforts among coalition members in Afghanistan, but cooperation was not always smooth or easy. Differences in organizational culture and mission combined with legal and systemic constraints to limit progress. Even within the U.S. government, major differences in organization and approach complicated civilian-military and interagency collaboration. For example, USAID and other development and humanitarian organizations were uncomfortable being associated with DoD's strategy of using "money as a weapons system," and DoD personnel were often focused on urgent stabilization efforts to achieve near-term military objectives that did not always mesh well with USAID's longer term development strategy. The Federal Acquisition Regulation governs all U.S. contracting, but DoD follows the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement, USAID has its own system of regulations called AIDAR, and other agencies also follow their own specific contracting policies. Finally, USAID's frequent use of large institutional contractors to implement complex development projects was distinct from the contracting practices of other U.S. organizations in Afghanistan, and it limited the comparability of data and scope of interagency standardization. USAID's distinctive mission and contracting structure also meant that its relationship with its institutional partners was sometimes different from that of DoD and its contractors.

The obstacles to cooperation and standardization were even larger among the various coalition partners and international organizations operating in Afghanistan. Distinct systems of laws and contracting regulations combined with sociocultural and linguistic differences to pose a range of challenges. Partners were sometimes hampered in sharing contract information because of differences in reporting standards and collection methods, and they were often reluctant to share sensitive information due to security concerns. Barriers to cooperation between the international community and Afghan

partners were particularly high and sometimes aggravated by mutual mistrust or misunderstanding.

Developing Standards for Local Procurement

Interagency and international cooperation in COIN contracting in Afghanistan helped the coalition standardize local procurement practices in several key areas. The issuance of common COIN contracting guidance from both USFOR-A/ISAF and the U.S. Embassy set the process in motion. Subsequently, USAID participated with ISAF and others in the development of standard COIN contracting metrics, including the proportion of contracts going to Afghan organizations, which helped focus coalition partners on achieving shared procurement objectives. TFBSO and PDT supported the Afghan First initiative by developing web portals that helped to centralize access to international business opportunities for Afghan vendors and foster matchmaking between international buyers and local sellers. TFBSO also worked to develop a database of fair market prices for various goods and services in Afghanistan that would assist in developing government cost estimates and evaluating bids, thus helping to combat contractor collusion and bid rigging.

Perhaps the most important challenge the international community faced in its implementation of Afghan First was to expand contracting with capable, legitimate Afghan partners while preventing contract funds from falling into the hands of corrupt or malign actors. DoD and USAID introduced a variety of measures, including strengthened contract auditing and monitoring, to help safeguard funds. The COIN guidance for USFOR-A and ISAF specifically directs contracting personnel to set up systems and standard databases to track the flow of funds to local vendors and prevent their diversion. In Iraq and Afghanistan, DoD required vendors to register in the Joint Contingency Contracting System (JCCS), a database and reporting tool that allowed posting of solicitations and proposals, review of vendor past performance, and tracking and oversight of in-theater contracts. USAID also began requesting that its contactors register in JCCS, but it did not make registration mandatory due to concerns by some USAID partners about sharing information with the military.

Contractor vetting lay at the core of U.S. efforts to safeguard funds from diversion and misuse. Both CENTCOM and USAID introduced vetting programs in 2010 and 2011 for non-U.S. contractors. One of the biggest challenges in the vetting process was verifying the identity of Afghan individuals and companies, since local record-keeping and systems of identification were rudimentary and "false positives" could result in funds being denied to legitimate contractors or, conversely, in malign actors inadvertently receiving U.S. contracts. In addition, corrupt contractors often attempted to hide identities and re-

lationships and to launder funds via shell companies and complex networks of intermediaries and subcontractors. In this regard, PDT's services in verifying the legitimacy of Afghan contractors were very important. Civilian-military information sharing was also vital, and the robust working relationship between TF 2010 and the U.S. Embassy yielded important dividends for both sides. Though USAID purposely limited its information sharing in some areas to protect its implementing partners, pooling information about malign actors—to take just one example—was important to the effectiveness of both vetting systems.

Thus, while CENTCOM and USAID shared significant resources in their vetting efforts, the two systems remained distinct. To some extent, this was logical, given differences in organizational mission, resources, structure, and contracting procedures. But, in a number of areas, greater standardization would certainly have been beneficial. For example, the threshold for vetting at CENTCOM was $100,000, while the threshold at USAID was $150,000. The criteria for evaluating contract risk, which could trigger award vetting below that threshold, also varied. And, as noted previously, CENTCOM had a sophisticated database for tracking vendors and their contracts, but USAID was unable to consistently track its contractors and their awards in the same way. The differences in requirements and procedures between CENTCOM and USAID—let alone across the whole range of contracting organizations in the international coalition—created unnecessary duplication of effort for vetting personnel, reduced the overall effectiveness of the vetting program, and made contracting with the international community even more burdensome and confusing for vendors.

Lessons for the Future

The COIN effort in Afghanistan is winding down, the COIN campaign in Iraq is long over, and the prospect of similar sustained, large-scale COIN and reconstruction efforts in the near future is uncertain. Nonetheless, as noted in the preface to the U.S. Government Counterinsurgency Guide, COIN efforts in the coming decades are almost inevitable.[2] Even if the United States cannot predict when or where the next COIN campaign will take place, it is wise to work with our allies to prepare for it now. Those preparations should include planning for local procurement standards.

It may be argued that planning for future COIN contracting based on recent experience is futile, because we have no idea what the next insurgency will look like, and because contingency operations are chaotic and difficult to prepare for in any case. Certainly, in Afghanistan, procurement practices and policies changed substantially dur-

ing the course of Operation Enduring Freedom, and clear and consistent COIN contracting policies and procedures only developed a decade into the conflict. But this is not a good reason to eschew advance planning for future insurgencies. It is true that COIN operations tend to be fluid and unpredictable, but experience shows that they are most likely to be necessary in weak or failed states with frail economies, infrastructure, and institutions. Most likely, levels of corruption will be high, and levels of human and social capital will be low. In short, future insurgencies are most likely to occur in countries that have much in common with Afghanistan, and the United States should plan accordingly.

The examples from Afghanistan cited in this article show the problems inherent in a local procurement strategy in which a large volume of contracts must be executed in a short time frame. The Afghan surge in 2010 and 2011 may have been necessary and justifiable, but the COIN contracting strategy would have worked more smoothly had it been developed earlier in the conflict. Local procurement works best when implemented consistently over the long term, allowing mutual trust and understanding to develop between contracting organizations and their partners.

In the final analysis, despite major strides toward common standards for local procurement in line with the COIN contracting strategy, progress was at best only partial. Without doubt, in any contingency operation, completely standardizing local procurement across all U.S. commands and agencies—let alone among international partners—is neither practical nor desirable. However, there are several obvious areas where a greater degree of standardization and consistency are logical and beneficial:

- Standardized databases, to facilitate information sharing among contracting organizations and vendors
- Standardized training and outreach to contracting organizations, to ensure adherence to a consistent set of preferred best practices
- Standardized training and outreach to vendors, to ensure equal access to contracting opportunities and a better understanding of contracting procedures
- Standardized procedures for partner vetting and contract monitoring and auditing.

Promulgating local procurement standards and ensuring consistent COIN contracting procedures applicable to all coalition members at the beginning and throughout the course of a contingency offers multiple advantages. First, it allows economies of scale and avoids duplication of effort (effective contractor vetting, for example, requires significant resources and is impractical for smaller organizations to undertake independently). Second, shared standards promote transparency and greater cooperation in procurement that can, in turn, foster broader collaboration among partners. Third, more consistent local procurement makes it easier for local vendors to do business with the United States and

its partners and promotes fair competition. Finally, a preexisting set of procurement standards facilitates planning for future requirements and allows for a more rapid and effective response to contingencies as they occur.

[1]U.S. Government Accountability Office, *Afghanistan: U.S. Efforts to Vet Non-U.S. Vendors Need Improvement*, GAO-11-355, June 2011, http://www.gao.gov/assets/320/319432.pdf.
[2]U.S. Interagency Counterinsurgency Initiative, *U.S. Government Counterinsurgency Guide*, January 2009, http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/119629.pdf.

About the Author

Garrett Menning is a senior consultant in LMI's Information Management group, where he supports acquisition efforts at the Department of State. Over the last 4 years, he has been heavily involved in U.S. government contracting reform efforts in conflict-affected countries. Dr. Menning came to LMI from USAID, where he served in Afghanistan and Washington, DC, working in the fields of small and medium enterprise development and contracting reform to help build the capacity of Afghan firms to access USAID funding and prevent diversion of those funds to terrorist and criminal groups in Afghanistan.

Program News

ASSIST Has a New Decision Support Tool

A new decision support tool, the DID Selector, is now available to help program managers, engineers, configuration managers, and logisticians identify program data requirements, minimize the risk of omitting useful data item descriptions (DIDs) in requests for proposals, and increase the use of repetitive DIDs for acquisitions. To access the DID Selector, log onto ASSIST (https://assist.dla.mil) and click the DIDs option on the left side of the screen; then click the DID Selector link.

This tool is intended to help users select active DIDs identified by subject matter experts for consideration according to one of three priorities: 1–Seriously Consider; 2–Consider; and 3–Consider (narrow application). Users may search for DIDs and filter search results by product support element, work breakdown structure, or standardization area. (Definitions of these filters may be reviewed using the links provided within the tool.) Besides assigned priorities, department-specific considerations may be displayed for some DIDs in the DID Selector search results. Users may also search for a specific word or phrase that appears in the Title, Scope, or Considerations columns of the DID Selector search results.

Each DID Approval Authority (DAA) is responsible for adding or modifying priorities and considerations to a DID and for ensuring that information in the DID Selector is reviewed annually to confirm it still reflects their respective organization's priorities.

Questions or comments about assigned priorities or department-specific considerations should be directed to the responsible DAA. General questions about DIDs or the DID Selector should be addressed to Karen.Bond@dla.mil.

AFMC Reorganizes Its Standardization Management Activities

The Air Force Materiel Command (AFMC) is aligning and redesignating 13 Air Force Standardization Management Activity (SMA) codes and adding 3 new codes to accommodate major organizational and management changes. The changes include the 2012 command reorganization from 12 centers to 5 centers and the on-

going implementation of standardization program priorities in the Air Force Engineering Enterprise Strategic Plan approved by the Secretary of the Air Force. The 5 centers are the Air Force Life Cycle Management Center (AFLCMC), Air Force Sustainment Center (AFSC), Air Force Nuclear Weapons Center (AFNWC), Air Force Test Center (AFTC), and Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL). A sixth center will be added in 2015.

The SMA code changes and additions are designed to better identify documents with the engineering organizations responsible for their content. Management of SMA workflow and document administration is now centralized in an AFMC Standardization Management Office located within AFLCMC. Organizational responsibilities are captured in a newly issued AFMC Supplement to Air Force Instruction 60-101; document assignment and point-of-contact changes are underway in ASSIST.

ANSI Announces Winners of 2014 Student Paper Competition

The American National Standards Institute (ANSI), coordinator of the U.S. voluntary standardization system, and its Committee on Education are pleased to announce that Lu Hao of Georgetown University (Washington, DC) is the first-place winner of the annual ANSI student paper competition. Second place has been awarded to Justin Carone of Drexel University (Philadelphia, PA). The contest is part of an ANSI-led effort to raise awareness about the strategic importance of standards and conformance among U.S. undergraduate and graduate students.

Entrants in this year's competition were asked to submit papers examining the role played by standards and conformity assessment in addressing emerging business challenges. The contest was open to students of any discipline currently enrolled in an associate, undergraduate, or graduate-level program at a U.S. academic institute of higher learning.

Ms. Hao's paper, "The Good, the Bad, and the Ambivalent: Equivalence Standards Program in Agricultural Trade," examines the ways in which equivalence standards for food safety can be used to facilitate trade and ensure safety in an increasingly global economy. The paper focuses on the U.S. broiler industry's Equivalence Determinant Program.

Program News

Mr. Carone's paper, "Standards as Social Design Practice: From the Americans with Disabilities Act to the Accessible Icon Project," looks at how social concerns affect the development and subsequent enforcement of standards. In the paper, Mr. Carone uses the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 and the redesign of the International Symbol for Accessibility as jumping-off points for an in-depth look at this complex issue.

Both winners received a cash prize for their winning paper, as well as a certificate for themselves and their schools.

The ANSI Committee on Education oversees all ANSI initiatives related to standards and conformity assessment education and outreach, carries out the objectives of the United States Standards Strategy, and responds to other issues that may be delegated by the ANSI Board of Directors, Executive Committee, or National Policy Committee. For more information about the ANSI Committee on Education, please contact Lisa Rajchel (lrajchel@ansi.org).

Events

Upcoming Events and Information

April 13–16, 2015, Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada

9th Annual IEEE International Systems Conference

This conference, sponsored by the IEEE Systems Council, seeks to create an interactive forum for the advancement of the practice of systems engineering across the multiple disciplines and specialty areas associated with the engineering of complex systems. The conference provides a venue for systems engineering practitioners, managers, researchers, and educators to exchange ideas, applications, and lessons learned addressing applications-oriented topics on large-scale systems and systems-of-systems; systems engineering, education, standards, processes, and methods for the systems-of-systems environment; and research opportunities and results relating to systems-of-systems. For more information, please go to http://ieeesyscon.org/.

May 19–21, 2015, Tysons, VA

GIDEP New-User Training Clinic

The Government-Industry Data Exchange Program (GIDEP) will be conducting a new-user training clinic designed specifically for GIDEP members who have less than 3 years in the program. This clinic, scheduled for May 19–21, 2015, will be held at LMI in Tysons, VA. GIDEP's new-user clinics are conducted in a track-style format, enabling all participants to attend every presentation, as well as to receive adequate hands-on training. They also receive in-depth training in database searching and utilization of the Participant Utilization Reporting System. On the last day of each clinic, the GIDEP Operations Center offers additional hands-on training. For further information, or to register, go to www.gidep.org, log in, and click Events.

May 20–22, 2015, Anaheim, CA

15th International ASTM/ESIS Symposium on Fatigue and Fracture Mechanics

ASTM International and the European Structural Integrity Society (ESIS) will hold the 15th International ASTM/ESIS Symposium on Fatigue and Fracture Mechanics on May 20–22, 2015. Sponsored by ASTM Committee E08 on Fatigue and Fracture, the symposium will be held at the Marriott Anaheim in Anaheim, CA, in conjunction with the committee's May standards development meetings. Multiscale physics- and mechanics-based approaches have gained increasing prominence in assessing the fatigue- and fracture-related design lives of the structures, components, and devices used in a wide variety of industries. The prevention of fatigue and fracture failures is critical to the safe operation and economic viability of machines, devices, and components across an increasingly broad spectrum, ranging from the aerospace and surface transportation, power generation, and petroleum communities to the semiconductor, biomedical, and microelectromechanical systems worlds. Each of these areas presents its own particular challenges to the development and application of engineering approaches to predict the structural integrity and remaining life of critical components and systems. For more information or to register, go to http://www.astm.org/SYMPOSIA/filtrexx40.cgi?+-P+EVENT_ID+2716+callforpapers.frm.

Events

Upcoming Events and Information

May 30–June 2, 2015, Nashville, TN

2015 ISERC

Sponsored by the Institute of Industrial Engineers (IIE), the Industrial and Systems Engineering Research Sessions (ISERC) will be held at the Renaissance Nashville Hotel as part of the IIE Annual Conference and Expo. ISERC is a forum for exchanging knowledge and discoveries in the industrial and systems engineering research community. Its purpose is to present scholarly work by researchers in academia or industry. Submissions of preliminary research results, works in progress, and significant or final results are welcome. For more information, go to http://www.iienet2.org/Annual2/details.aspx?id=10150.

June 22–25, 2015, Prague, Czech Republic

SAE 2015 International Conference on Icing of Aircraft, Engines, and Structures

The SAE 2015 International Conference on Icing of Aircraft, Engines, and Structures provides participants a high-quality technical program focusing on meteorology, aircraft icing systems, and ground deicing operations. Government agencies use this conference as their platform to discuss critical studies and new developments in icing and deicing standards. This conference provides a forum for the aerospace community to meet and discuss the newest regulations governing aircraft icing operations, the latest technologies and systems designed to deice and to keep ice from forming on an aircraft, current and future challenges, and upcoming opportunities within industry. For more information or to register, go to http://www.sae.org/events/icing/.

June 22–26, 2015, Dallas, TX

AIAA Complex Aerospace System Exchange

The American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics (AIAA) will hold its Complex Aerospace System Exchange at the Hilton Anatole in Dallas, TX. For more information, please go to http://www.aiaa.org/EventDetail.aspx?id=24069.

July 13–16, 2015, Seattle, WA

25th Annual INCOSE International Symposium

The INCOSE International Symposium, sponsored by the International Council on Systems Engineering (INCOSE), is the premier international forum for systems engineering. This year's symposium will be held at the Hyatt Regency Bellevue, Seattle, WA. Participants can network; share ideas, knowledge, and practices; and learn about innovations, trends, experiences, and issues in systems engineering. Papers, panels, and presentations focus on addressing how systems engineering principles and perspectives are applied today and how systems engineers will play an increasing role of influence in the future. Examples of topics are technology insertion, process improvements, and organizational governance of the systems we make, manage, operate, and maintain over their life cycle in the context of global multicultural and multidisciplinary challenges. For more information on this event or to register, go to http://www.incose.org/.

People

People in the Standardization Community

Welcome

James Jobe, of the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), was recently named DLA Standardization Executive, replacing Ms. Christine Metz, who retired in September. In his other duties at DLA, Mr. Jobe serves as chief of product assurance for DLA. In this role, he is responsible for managing the development and implementation of DLA policies and procedures related to engineering and technical issues, quality management, materiel standardization, value management, individual unique identification, and counterfeit and technical data management. We welcome him to the defense standardization community.

Thomas Konen, from the Technical Policy and Standards Group at the Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA), assumed responsibility as the NAVSEA Command Standards Officer in March 2014. His background is in engineering and program management at the Naval Surface Warfare Center, Carderock Division (NSWCCD), managing integrated logistics support products for hull, mechanical, and electrical (HM&E) systems; the Planned Maintenance System; and technical manuals. He also manages fleet feedback reports for those programs. Previously, Mr. Konen managed the life-cycle and technical documentation associated with HM&E instrumentation, including temperature, pressure, tank-level sensors, infrared sensor flow meters, speed, and revolution sensors. In addition, he managed NSWCCD's shock, vibration, and environmental laboratories. Mr. Konen participated on the ASME International B40 Committee on Standards for Pressure and Temperature Instruments and Accessories and supported the development of non-government standard documentation as part of the standards reform effort. He also has served as the ship critical safety item (CSI) technical manager for the Ship CSI supplier qualification process and, as the technical documentation/specifications and standards coordinator for NSWCCD, supported the engineering staff in policy and procedures pertaining to the management and revision of technical documentation.

Effective November 2, 2014, **Diane Huff** began serving as the Marine Corps terminologist. She served in the Marine Corps as a photographic specialist within the Marine Corps' public affairs office. After she left the Marine Corps, she com-

People

People in the Standardization Community

pleted her bachelor's degree and then taught school for several years before returning to the Marine Corps as a civilian. Upon her return to the Marine Corps, she provided editorial support to the Enlisted Professional Military Education Office at the Marine Corps University and Doctrine Control Branch at the Marine Corps Combat Development Command.

Farewell

DLA's **Christine Metz** retired after 35 years of federal service. In her last position at DLA, Ms. Metz was the chief of the Technical and Quality Policy Division, where she oversaw the development and implementation of agency policies and procedures related to engineering and technical issues. Prior to that, Ms. Metz served in a variety of roles at DLA with responsibility for policy and oversight of technical and quality programs, which including standardization, quality, automation, product verification, and value management. During the 1990s, Ms. Metz worked as a program analyst at DSPO when it was under the Acquisition Practices Directorate for the Office of the Secretary of Defense. In that role, she was responsible for DoD policy for the acquisition of commercial and non-developmental items and served on the Defense Conversion Commission as a staff expert on commercial military integration and dual-use technologies. Many will remember her long tenure on the Defense Standardization Council, where she served as the DLA Standardization Executive for almost a decade. A special friend of the DSP, Ms. Metz offered continuous support and many innovations, and she will be greatly missed. We wish her well in retirement.

L. G. Traylor retired after 34 years of federal service. In his last assignment, Mr. Traylor worked for the Air Force Materiel Command (AFMC) Standardization Office and served an integral role in its reengineering and reorganization efforts. With many years of experience and leadership as a cataloging, provisioning, and equipment specialist, Mr. Traylor spent portions of his career working for the Defense Electronics Supply Center (Kettering, OH), the Defense Supply Center (Columbus, OH), and the Air Force Cataloging and Standardization Center, all prior to assuming his position at AFMC. We wish him well in retirement.

DPMP Defense Parts Management Portal

Defense Parts Management Portal–DPMP

The DPMP is a new public website brought to you by the Parts Standardization and Management Committee (PSMC) to serve the defense parts management community.

The DPMP is a new resource, a new marketplace, and a "one-stop shop" for parts management resources. It is a navigation tool, a communication and collaboration resource, and an information exchange. It gives you quick and easy access to the resources you need, saves you time and money, connects you to new customers or suppliers, and assists you with finding the answers you need.

This dynamic website will grow and be shaped by its member organizations. A new and innovative feature of the DPMP is its use of "bridge pages." Organizations with interests in parts and components are invited to become DPMP members by taking control of a bridge page. Chances are good that your organization is already listed in the DPMP.

There is no cost.

Explore the DPMP at https://dpmp.lmi.org. For more information, look at the documents under "Learn more about the DPMP." Click "Contact Us" to send us your questions or comments.





Upcoming Issues
Call for Contributors

We are always seeking articles that relate to our themes or other standardization topics. We invite anyone involved in standardization—government employees, military personnel, industry leaders, members of academia, and others—to submit proposed articles for use in the *DSP Journal*. Please let us know if you would like to contribute.

Following are our themes for upcoming issues:

Issue	Theme
January/March 2015	Non-Government Standards
April/June 2015	Standardization Stars
July/September 2015	Standards Policy

If you have ideas for articles or want more information, contact Tim Koczanski, Editor, *DSP Journal*, Defense Standardization Program Office, 8725 John J. Kingman Road, STOP 5100, Fort Belvoir, VA 22060-6220 or e-mail DSP-Editor@dla.mil.

Our office reserves the right to modify or reject any submission as deemed appropriate. We will be glad to send out our editorial guidelines and work with any author to get his or her material shaped into an article.


DEFENSE STANDARDIZATION PROGRAM
MAKING SYSTEMS WORK TOGETHER